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One of the principal actors in the regulation of the economies around the world are
the Central Banks. Central banks have the function of controlling price stability and
managing the supply of credit and money. ' They also administered foreign reserves and
are generally the government bankers." In some countries, the Central Bank also manages
the exchange rates.
Since Central Banks hold the reserves from commercial banks and are lenders of last
resort, they have certain responsibilities in the stability of the financial system.
Sometimes they even have duties as regulators and supervisors of the financial system.
The role of Central Banks in national economies is more important every day. These
entities have rapidly adjusted to new political and economical situations. Their existence
is a very important issue of political sovereignty . In today's economies, every nation
needs a Central Bank to fulfill different duties that will produce a positive impact in its
economy.
' Stanley Filcher, Modern Central Banking, Bank of England (1994). See also Paul A. Volker & Miguel
Mancera and Jean Gordeux, Perspective On The Role OfA Central Bank, 17 MD. I.Int'l L.& Trade 141
(stating that the most important contribution of a central bank is to create price stability since it stimulates





Forest Copie, Charles Goodhart & Norbert Shadt, The Development ofCentral Banking, Bank of
England(1994).
Generally speaking, Central Banks are viewed with respect and admiration.
5
Countries derive many benefits from having a respected, professional and solid bank6 .
This work is a comparative piece between the Federal Reserve System and the Bank
of the Republic. In doing this comparison and before getting into more specific issues,
one must take into account that there are structural differences between the United States
and Colombia.
In the first place, the United States has a federal system composed of national and
state powers while Colombia has a centralist system with powers mainly at the national
level. The legal structure of each country is different since the United States is a common
law system and Colombia is a civil law system. Another important consideration is that
the United States is the economic power of the world while Colombia is a developing
country.
The deductive method, going from the general to particular issues, will be used in
this work. The reason for this approach is to give the reader a background of general
matters related to central banking in the United States and in Colombia in order to make
more comprehensible specific issues like supervision and regulation of the financial
system by central banks.
The first part of this paper will focus on the origin and legal nature of the American
Federal Reserve System established by the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 and Colombia's
Bank of the Republic. Next, I will offer a deep study of the structure of the Federal
Reserve System, concentrating on institutions like the Board of Governors, the Federal
Reserve Bank, the Federal Open Market Committee, and member banks . I will also
5 Wat 128.
Id.
describe and analyze Colombia's Bank of the Republic, placing emphasis on the reforms
introduced by the new Constitution.
In Chapter IV the main faculties, functions and operations undertaken by each of
these Central Banks will be briefly explained and described.
The following chapter will focus on the role of central banks as supervisors and
regulators of the financial system, particularly in the United States and Colombia. In this
segment, this paper will focus on other regulators and supervisors of the system and the
areas in which the Central Bank of each country is empowered to regulate or supervise.
Finally, this study will concentrate on all the arguments in favor of and against
regulations and supervision of the financial System by the central banks and the
similarities and differences of the American and Colombian systems in these areas.
CHAPTER II
CENTRAL BANKS ORIGIN AND NATURE
A. United States Federal Reserve System
Before the enactment of the Federal Reserve Act, the supply of money and credit in
the United States was irregular
7
and the banking system had been subject to several
o
crises, the strongest in 1907 . During these crises, the public demanded the gold and
currency they had deposited in the banks. Banks were not prepared for these withdrawals
and were forced to take extreme measures like asking for loans and selling their assets
9
.
In this context, Congress established the National Monetary Commission headed by
Senator N.W. Aldrich to study the problems of the financial system and to formulate
some remedies
10
. In 1912, the Aldrich commission recommended the adoption of a pure
central bank with centralized reserves, centralized facilities, and centralized note issues .
This model had been adopted in several European countries and was working in a very
effective way 1 .
7 BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL, RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS (6 th
ed. 1974) [hereinafter Purposes and Functions].










Meanwhile, democrats in the Congress formed a Banking and Currency Committee
to make a similar investigation 13 . The subcommittee for banking reform was headed by
the House of Representative Carter Glass. After studying the issue, this subcommittee
concluded that a centralized central bank was not appropriate for the United States and
recommended a district organization 14 .
In the end of that year, Woodrow Wilson was elected president of the United States 15 .
President Wilson supported the Glass subcommittee approach with a few modifications 16 .
On September 18. 1913, the "Glass Bill", with some changes, was approved by the House
of Representatives
17
. Afterwards, the Senate began its debates and discussion, coming up




This act which created the Federal Reserve System is known as the Federal Reserve
Act. The main purpose of the original act was to have an elastic currency, and a more
effective banking system for supervision and facilities for rediscounting commercial
papers
19
. Another objective of the act was to promote the stability of the economy by
regulating credit.
20
13 BENJAMIN HAGGOT BECKHART, FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, (American Institute of Banking








Haggot, supra note 13, at 24.
18
Id at 25.The Congress passed the Federal Reserve Act based on the power granted by the Constitution in
article 1 Section 5 which empowers it "to coin money and regulate the value thereof.
19
Functions and Purposes, supra note 7 at 1
.
20
Alfred C. Aman Jr., Bargainingfor Justice: An examination ofthe Use and Limits ofConditions by the
Federal Reserve Board, 74 Iowa L.Rev.837, 843 (1989)[hereinafter Aman].
The act created a unique decentralized central bank structure organized in three
levels: the Board of Governors, twelve regional Reserve Banks and Bank members 21 .
The legal nature of each is very different. The Board of Governors is a public entity with
special characteristics that will be described in the next chapter, the Regional Reserve
Banks are privately owned entities under federal supervision and the member banks are
privately owned entities22 .
The Federal Reserve System has developed throughout the years and has been
amended several times in order to adapt to new political and economical circumstances.
B. Colombia's Bank of the Republic
Before 1923, banks that issued their owned money existed in Colombia and attempts
to created a central bank had failed. Economist and politicians discussed the possibility
of the concentration of the issuing of money power in one bank or the total liberty for
commercial banks to issue their own money. 23
To avoid a crisis in the financial and monetary systems and to give more elasticity to
currency, the necessity of a Central Bank was perceived
24
. In accordance with this, the
government contracted a group of American banking experts, led by professor Edwin
Kemmerer, which did a deep and exhaustive analysis and concluded that Colombia
needed a Central Bank, along with financial and fiscal reform .
25
21 A/ at 840.
:: Mark F. Bernstein, The Federal Open Market Committee and the Sharing ofGovernmental Power with
Private Citizens, 75 Va. L.Rev. 111,112 (1989)[hereinafter Bernstein].
23 JORGE ENRIQUE IBANEZ, EL BANCO DE LA REPUBLICA: ANTECEDENTES, EVOLUCION Y
ESTRUCTURA( Banco de la Republica ed. 1993)[hereinafter Ibanez]
"IdsX 167-69.
25 MURICIO AVELLA GOMEZ, PENSAMIENTO Y POLITICA MONETARIA EN COLOMBIA 1886-
1945, ( Contraloria General de la Republica ed. 1987).
Congress adopted Kemmer's suggestions and created The Bank of the Republic as an
emission and deposit bank with the power of discount26 .
The capital of the bank was divided in four kinds of stocks. Class A stocks represent
50% of the bank's capital and was own by the government. Class B,C. and D stocks were
own by National Banks, Foreign Banks with business in Colombia and the public in
general respectively and represent the other 50% of the bank's capital. 27
The original bank had a peculiar legal structure: it was an Anonymous Society28
created under commercial laws with public service functions granted by an administrative
act which also authorized the bank to make emission of currency29 .
The instruments of monetary policy used by the bank were limited to discount
operations. The Board of Directors of the Bank was composed of representatives of
public and private sectors and was authorized to make and execute the monetary policy.
Several laws were passed by the Congress in order to amend the original act giving
new powers to the bank like determining exchange rates30 , establishing reserve





of the country, and
give subsidy credit to some sectors of the economy
33
.
26 Law 25 of 1993.
27 JAIME MARTINEZ RECAMAN, HISTORIA JURIDICA DEL BANCO DE LA REPUBLICA, (Banco
de la Republica ed. 1980).
28 For the purposes of this note, these kind of entities are the equivalent to American Corporations.
29
Martinez, supra note 27, at 1 1
.
30 Law 82 of 1931.
31
Legislative Decree 1407 of 1948.
"Law 82 of 1931.
33 Decrees 384 and 1249 of 1950.
8
Between 1949 and 1951, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System send
two commissions to Colombia, one leaded by Lauchlin Currie and the other one by
Richard Grove and Gerald Alterwhich34 . These commissions recommended the adoption
of several instruments needed for the correct direction of monetary, credit and exchange
policies and the development of the economy. Two government decrees adopted these




Since private bankers became owners of the Bank of the Republic, pressures were
created in order to separate the policy making functions of the bank and give them to a
government entity36 . In response to this problem, Congress issued the law 21 of 1963
which reformed the central banking system in Colombia. This law created the Monetary
Board, a public entity composed of different members of the government,
37
with the
function of regulating all aspects related to monetary, credit and exchange policies
38
. The
Bank of the Republic continued to be privately owned and had the duty to execute all
decisions and policies adopted by the Board
39
.
Ten years later, Congress decided to Nationalize the Bank of the Republic
40
and the
government acquired 99.99% of the stocks
41
. This decision ended the reason for the
34
Martinez, supra note 27, at 61 (also stating that the bank acquire functions of a modern central bank and
macroeconomics stabilizer).
35
See Decrees 756 and 2057 of 1951.
36
Ibanez, supra note 23, at 514-15.
37 The Monetary Board was initially composed by the Ministers of Finance, Development and Agriculture,
by the Director of the Department of National Planning, by the Director of the Colombian Institute for
International Commerce and by the General Manager of the bank.
38 See Law 21 of 1923.
39
Id.
40 Law 7 of 1973.
separation of the central bank since the Bank and the Monetary Board were public
entities.
Under this system, the government had a very strong influence over these policies
since the members of the Monetary Board were part of the same economic team.
In 1991, the Constitution of 1886 was replaced. The new Colombian Constitution
introduce a radical and structural reform of the central bank system
42
. As noted earlier, the
origin and legal base of the Bank of the Republic was a law passed by the Congress.
Drafters of the new Constitution gave the central bank constitutional status. In this way,




The 1991 Constitution eliminated the Monetary Board and created the Board of
Directors of the Bank of the Republic. This Board has supreme monetary, exchange and
credit authority
44
. It also established the Bank of the Republic as the central bank, formed
as a public legal person with administrative, patrimonial and technical autonomy
45
.
The Constitution also empowered the Congress to pass a law which the Bank of the
Republic has to respect while exercising its functions, and that gives the general
parameters of the structure, functions and special legal system of the bank
4, 6
41
Ibanez, supra note 23, at 538.
42 COLOM. CONST. t.XII, ch.6.
43
Id.
44COLOM. CONST, art. 372.
45 COLOM. CONST, art. 371.
46 COLOM. CONST, art. 150 ord.13, ord. 19 lit.b, ord.22.
CHAPTER III
STRUCTURE AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE CENTRAL BANKS
A. Federal Reserve System
The Federal Reserve System is composed essentially by the Board of Governors, the
Reserve Banks, the Bank Members and the Federal Open Market Committee. The system
also counts with an Advisory Committee and other committees and conferences that have
different objectives and purposes. Each of these components of the Federal Reserve
System will be treated in these section.
I.- Board of Governors of The Federal Reserve
The bank's Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve is a public entity
47
. In 1914,
an opinion rendered by the Attorney General of the United States classified the Federal
Reserve Board (today's Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve) as "an independent
bureau, or establishment, and as such not under the jurisdiction of the Treasury
48
Department" . The important aspect of this opinion is the express recognition of certain
independence of the Board from the government
49
, especially from the Secretary of
Treasury which is the fiscal authority of the country.
47
Bernstein, supra note 22, at 112.
48
Haggot, supra note 13, at 24 (citing H. Parker Willis, The Federal Reserve System (New York:
Ronald, 1923)). See also Functions and Purposes, supra note 7, at 3 (stating that the Federal Reserve System
is "independent within the government". This statement is based on the facts that decisions by the Board are
not revisable by the president but the Board has certain duties like reports to the Congress and work within
the general economic and financial objectives established by the government. Besides, President and
Congress play an essential role in the appointing process).
49
The issue of Central Banks independence has been discussed in the past decades among economist and
legal scholars. The independence refers to the relation of the Central Bank specially with the government
but also with other branches of the public power. Independence is necessary, particularly from the
government, in order to avoid interference that will affect in a negative way monetary stability in the long
10
11
This independence empowers the Board to act in accordance with its best judgment
respecting the parameters and the sphere of action establish by the Congress in the law50 .
The faculties and power's possessed by the Board were obtained by delegation from the
Congress in the Federal Act and its respective amendments.
A very important aspect for maintaining the independence of the Board is that their
expenses are not part of the United States government budget and therefore are not
considered government or appropriate funds 51 and not subject to congressional revision52 .
These funds are obtained from the Reserve Banks, they are considered public 53 and can be
expended in a discretionary way by the board54 . If congress had the power to vote the
term. The most important topics related to central bank independence are the appointing process and term
of board members, politics of loans to the government, supervision of the bank, government's
representation on the Board and patrimonial autonomy. The degree of independence depends on several
factors like its constitutional or legal status, general public support and political, economical and social
climate of the country. Most industrializes countries have central banks with some sort of independence.
Recently, several countries have reform there central banks and established independence. See Alex
Cukierman, The Economics ofCentral Banking, Paper Prepared for the Eleventh World Congress of the
International Economic Association, December, 1995, Tunis, Tunisia at 1 [hereinafter Cukierman] (stating
that since 1989 twenty five countries including Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, New Zealand, Argentina,
Chile, Colombia. Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria and Hungary have "substantially upgraded the legal
independence" of their central bank). Independence of Central banks has provided a positive impact in the
economies. See Cukierman (proving that in countries with independence of the Central Bank there are
lower rates of inflation and equal or higher rates of growth). See also Bach, supra note 8, at 208-220
(commenting about the Federal Reserve independence). Several studies have demonstrated that a Central
bank is not totally independent until it controls foreign exchange policies. See Roberto Junguito B. &
Hemando Vargas, Central Bank Independence and Foreign Exchange policies in Latin America, IMF-
Banco de la Republica, seminar on Central Bank Independence, Bogota, Feb. 1996 at 7. See Alex
Cukierman & Steven B. Webb, Political Influence on the Central Bank: International Evidence, The
World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 9, No. 3, at 397-423 (1995) (demonstrating that political instability in
a country causes instability in the central bank. Also commenting that on developed countries the legal
establishment of central bank Independence is important to control inflation, and on developing countries
the rotation of governors or directors of the central bank influences in a direct way the inflation rate).
50




52 Aman, supra note 20, at 850.
53 30Op.Atty.Gen.308,1914.
54 Aman, supra note 20, at 850.
12
appropriation of funds for the Board, it would have a very big influence on the Federal
Reserve policy
55
and the independence would be restricted in a sensitive way.
The income and expenses of the Board are audited by independent certified public
accounting firms
56
. Each Reserve bank has an auditor that reports to the Board of
Governors, and is also authorized to examine the accounts of these banks
57
.
Regulation of the Board's monetary policy is practically not revisable by the Courts,
and its other regulatory functions are so discretionary that the review is limited in an
CO
important way.
In order to control that the independence of the Board of Governors does not exceed
its limits, each year it has to make a full report of all its operations and activities to the
House of Representatives,59 and transmit a report on economic issues to Congress twice a
year and publish a weekly statement
60
.
In the original act, the Board was composed of five members appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate for a period often years, with the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Comptroller of the Currency acting as ex officio members
61
. The
Secretary of Treasury was the chairman of the Board and the President designated the
Governor and vice-governor from the members
62 (now called Chairman and Vice
Chairman).
" Haggot, supra note 13, at 32.
6
/c/ at 3 1
.
"Id




Functions and Purposes, supra note 7, at 23.




Several modifications to the Board's structure took place during the 20's and 30's.
The most important was the Banking Act of 1935 which modified the appointed members
to seven and eliminated the ex officio members. Now there is no direct participation of
the Government in the Board. This way, the Board became more independent from the
Secretary of Treasury, one of the biggest borrowers of the system
63
. This amendment also
extended the term of the governors to fourteen years.
Today's Board of Governors consists of seven members appointed by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate
64
. Members are appointed for a term of fourteen
years and cannot be reappointed after completing a full term
65
. The sequence of the
terms of the members is design in such way that each two years a member term expires66 .
This way the influence of the current government over the Board is lessen since each
President appoints only two members. Additionally, the fourteen years term gives more
stability to the policies and decisions adopted.
Members cannot come from the same federal district; will represent several sectors
of the economy
67
and can be removed by the President only "for cause"
68
. Complete
dedication to the functions of the Board is required of the members. Members of the




12 U.S.C. s 241(1996). Congress participation in the appointing process limits in a certain way the
discretion of the government, but it also produces the risk that the process will be politicized.
65 Bach, supra note 8, at 2 1
.
66
12 U.S.C. s 242 (1996).
67
12 U.S.C. s 241(1996). (for the purposes of this note, the sectors of the economy are financial,
agricultural, industrial and commercial).
68
Bach, supra note 8, at 21.
14
after living the office, unless they have completed the fourteen-year term.
69
The Board
has a Chairman and a Vice Chairman appointed by the president and confirmed by the
Senate for a four-year term
70
. The chairman is the C.E.O. of the Board and presides at its
meetings. In case of absence, the Chairman will be replaced by the Vice Chairman 71 .
The Board approves the Federal Banks budget, the salaries of their officers and other
expenses.
72
The Board's staff examines the Federal Reserve Banks in order to determine
their financial condition and compliance with laws and regulations.
73
The Board represents the system in most of its relations with the executive and
legislative branches,
74
and is the policy maker.
75
All the issues that have contributed to
the Board's independence have been discussed in different occasions by Congress and
have produce tensions and different opinions
76
.
The main functions of today's Board are to formulate the monetary policy
77
and to




12 U.S.C. s 242 (1996). See LAWRENCE S. RITTER AND WILLIAM L. SILBER, PRINCIPLES OF
MONEY BANKING AND FINANCE MARKETS, 173 (7 Ed. Basic Books Inc. 1991)[hereinafter Ritter
and Silber] (Commenting that the Chairman is the most important and influential member of the Board and












Bach, supra note 8, at 22.
16See Ritter & Silber, supra note 69, at 178 (commenting that some congressmen believe that the Federal
Reserve has too much independence and that other Congressmen think that some guidelines should be
passed in order to limit the discretion of the system.
77
Functions and Purposes, supra note 7 , at 14 (Commenting that the Board is a majority in the Federal
Open Market Committee who is the most important monetary policy maker. Also stating that the Board
15
2.- Federal Reserve Banks
The Federal Reserve Act divided the United States territory into twelve districts,
each one with a Federal Reserve Bank. The federal banks are located in Atlanta. Boston.
Chicago. Cleveland. Dallas. Kansas City, Minneapolis, New York. Philadelphia.
Richmond, San Francisco and Saint Louis
79
. There are also twenty-five branches in
different cities of the country. This mechanism of branches gives access to the system to
different regions of the United States
80
.
The operations of the Federal Reserve System are conducted by the Federal Reserve
Banks 81 . These banks are individual legal entities, privately owned82 and operating in the
public interest
8
" and supervised by the Board of Governors.
84
Earnings of these banks




establishes the reserve requirements of the banks, regulates the discount windows of the Federal Reserve
Banks and establishes the deposit interest rates ) See P. Samuelson & W. Nordhausm Economics 265-325
(12th ed. 1985)(stating that the regulation of the supply of money is the most important tool policy
makers).
78
Id. The Board cannot delegate functions related to credit and monetary policies. See 12 U.S.C.A.s225a.
(1996).
79
Functions and Purposes, supra note 7. at 15.
80Bemstein, supra note 22, at 847.
81
Functions and Purposes, supra note 7, at 15.
8: See section 12 U.S.C. s 282-287 which regulates the Capital and Stock of the Federal Reserve Banks.
These sections establish that every national bank and member bank should subscribe stock of the Federal
Reserve bank of its respective district. They also establish that no private entity different from the
mentioned above can have more than U.S. $ 25.000 worth of stock of any Reserve Bank.
83
Bach, supra note 8, at 23. see also Haggot, supra note 13 at 44 ( stating that Reserve Banks are
between government and private but not part of the government.)
84
See also B. BECKHART, FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, (1972 ) (establishing that the Reserve
Banks are almost public entities).
85
Functions and Purposes, supra note 7, at 17.
16
The Federal Reserve Banks are conducted and supervised in an impartial way by a
Board of Directors. 86 The Board of directors consists of nine members divided into three
categories: three class A directors which represent member banks, three class B directors
which represent the public and three class C directors that represent the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve.
87
In order to select Class A and B directors, member banks nominate and elect the
candidates without consideration of color, sex, race or national origin
88
. Class C directors
are appointed by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve and cannot be stock
holders of any bank.
89 One of the class C directors is designated by the Board of
Governors as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Reserve Bank, another one is
selected to be Deputy Chairman and may replace the Chairman in case of absence. 90
Each Reserve Bank has a President selected by the Board of Directors with prior approval
of the Board of Governors.
The Chairman of the Board of Directors is the federal agent that represents the Board
of governors and reports to this institution
91
. The members of the Board of Directors of
each Reserve bank have a three-year term
92
.
86 12U.S.C. s 301(1996).
87
12 U.S.C. s 302 (1996). See also Bach, supra note 8, at 25( stating that class A director are bankers
representing small, medium and large banks of the district, and that class B directors must be engaged in
the commercial, agriculture or industrial sector of the district).
88 Id
89
Functions and Purposes, supra note 7, at 17. See also Bach, supra note 8, at 25 (stating that Class B and
C director cannot be officers, directors or employees of any bank).
90




12 U.S.C. s 308 (1996).
17
3.- Federal Open Market Committee
The actual Federal Open Market Committee was created in the Banking Act of 1935
to control and determine the open market operations that will be conducted by the Federal
Reserve.
93 Open market operations are the most important mechanisms to make monetary
policy and they include activities like buying and selling government securities, federal
agencies' securities, bankers' acceptances, and direct operations in foreign exchange
markets.
94
This committee must have a national perspective of credit problems and solutions
95
and makes broad policy decisions that are executed by the Federal Reserve Banks. 96
These banks may engage in open market operations but only according to the directions
and regulations of the committee.
9?
The Federal Open Market Committee is composed of seven members of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve and five Reserve Bank presidents98 , one of them, the
"Functions and Purposes, supra note 7, at 14. (Commenting that the FOMC was the predecessor of
another open market committee created in the Bank Act of 1933 which consist of one member from each
Federal Reserve Bank. At that time, these Banks kept the faculty to decide if they participated in the
operation established by the system. The Board had strong power in these topics because they regulate




Haggot, supra note 13, at 43 (stating that this situation creates equilibrium with the regional perspective
that is brought by the Reserve banks).
96
Bach, supra note 8, at 25.
97
Functions and Purposes, supra note 7, at 15. See also Bach, supra note 8 at 25.
98
See 12 U.S.C. s 263 ( The representatives are elected annually in the following way: one from New
York, one from Boston, Philadelphia and Richmond, one from Chicago and Cleveland, one from Atlanta,
Dallas and St. Louis and one from Kansas City, Minneapolis and San Francisco.) see also Bemestein,
supra note 22, at 1 1 8( stating that even though the Board approves the candidates, it cannot control who
will be selected and there is no regulation established that regulates the way in which one of these member
can be remove). See Ritter & Silber, supra note 69, at 176 (commenting that in recent years not only open
market operations but all policy matters are reviewed by the FOMC. Also stating that the twelve reserve
bank presidents attend and participate in these meetings.)
18
president of the New York Federal Reserve Bank". It meets at least four times a year in
Washington to review the monetary and credit situation 100 , and after each meeting issues
instructions for daily purchase and sales to the reserve Bank of New York. 101 The
committee has his own organization. The Chairman of the Board of Governors is the
Chairman of the committee and the president of the New York Federal Reserve Bank is
the Vice Chairman.
Detailed operations related to these matters are made by an executive committee
composed of five members of the Open Market Committee, three governors and two
presidents of Reserve Banks 102 . This committee consults and makes recommendations to
the Treasury on financial issues. 103
To some legal scholars, this committee represents a very particular example of
"sharing government power with private representatives", 104 and it's the result of political
compromises between those in favor of total control by the Board, and those in favor of
control by private bankers.
105
Defenders of the actual system argued that if the Reserve
Banks did not participate in this committee, their presidents will be relegated to execute
routine operations and the "heart" of the Reserve System will break.
106
99
Functions and Purposes, supra note 7. at 15 (commenting that the other Banks presidents serve one year
and are continuously rotating).
100
Bach, supra note 8, at 25.
101
Bernstein, supra note 22, at 116.
102:
Bach, supra note 8, at 25.
103
Id at 25 ( Noting the deliberations of the committee necessarily have to touch different questions about
credit policy).
l04
Bernstein, supra note 22, at 125.
105
Id at 121 (Commenting that the House of Representatives wanted more control of the committee by the
Federal Reserve, limiting the banks representatives to advisory status. Senate instead wanted a mix and
share power between the Reserve Banks and the Board).
106 Haggot, supra note 13, at 43( citing words of Allen Sproul, former President of the Federal Reserve
19
The conformation of the committee has raised questions about the delegation of
powers and for this reason it has been challenge in courts several times
107
, the last one in
Melchor v. FOMC 108 . In this case, a Senator of the Unites States alleged that election of
members of the committee by Reserve Banks took away his constitutional role in the
appointments process
109
. The District Court held that Congress was authorized to
delegate some of its Constitutional powers to private citizens and for this reason the
composition of the committee was not unconstitutional 110 . The Court also concluded that
since open market operations are not inherent to government function, they can be
delegated to the FOMC 111 . The judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals 112 .
All decisions rendered by the courts in these matters have made the composition of
the committee judicially not revisable 113 .
This committee has a great deal of responsibility in the decision making process that
will affect the whole economy. The participation of private parties involves a very high
risk that decisions will be adopted based on particular interests rather than on public




Bernstein, supra note 22, at 131 (commenting that the conformation of the committee has been
challenge in Brian v. FOMC, 235 F.Supp. 877 (D.Mont. 1964), Reuss v. Balles, 584 F. 2d. 873 (1981),
Committee of Monetary' Reform v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, 766 F.2d. 538 (D.C. Cir.
1985)).










Bernstein, supra note 22, at 131.
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4.- Federal Advisory Council
This council was established to advise the Board, to guarantee adequately hearing
to the member banks and to expose decisions to the public 114 . It is considered a channel
between the Board of Governors and the bankers.
115
The main function of the council is
to advise the Board on business and credit conditions
116
. The council is empowered to
call for information and to make recommendations concerning the Federal Reserve
System, but it has no legal power to force authorities to adopt its recommendations and
suggestions.
118
The council is composed of twelve members, one of each Federal Reserve District.
Members are prominent private commercial bankers and are elected by the Board of
Directors of the Federal Reserve Banks.
119
The meetings of the council take place in
Washington at least four times a year. This entity selects his own officers which are the
1 JO
President, the Vice President, the Secretary and five executive officers.
5.- Member Banks
The banking system of the United States has a dual form; we find National and State
banks. National banks are chartered by the Comptroller of the Currency and State banks
are chartered by any of the states of the union
121




Haggot, supra note 13, at 38 (stating that this was a concession to the banking community since they
had no representation on the Board of Governors).
116
Bach, supra note 8, at 29.
" 7
Haggot, supra note 13, at 38.
118




Haggott, supra note 13, at 38.
'"'JONATHAN R. MACEY, GEOFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION, (Little,
Brown and Company 4th ed. 1992)[hereinafterMacey and Miller].
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members of the Federal Reserve System 122 . On the other hand, State banks can become
members of the system if they fulfill some requirements 123 .
To become a member of the system, the bank must subscribe and pay for stock of the
Federal Reserve bank of its district equal to six percent of its own capital and surplus 124 .
Once the Bank becomes a member of the system it automatically gets some privileges
and some obligations.
Member banks can borrow funds from the Reserve Banks of the district subject to
the regulations of the moment and they can order or forward currency according to their
necessity. They participate in the election of six members of the Board of Directors of
the Reserve Bank, they are allowed to use the systems facilities for different purposes like
checking clearing, and they share the information provided by the system 125 . Member
banks are able to use a computer communication system to transfer funds and marketable
government securities 126 . Membership also gives prestige and publicity to the banks
127
.
Membership also involves the fulfillment of certain duties. They are required to
maintain the reserve requirements establish by the Board, a requirement that is usually
more stringent than for non member banks 128 . Members are also subject to federal laws
Brown and Company 4th ed. 1992)[hereinafter Macey and Miller].
122 12 U.S.C. s 222 (1996) (National banks are required to become members of the system when they
initiate operations or within ninety days after the admission into the State were they are located).
123
12 U.S.C. s 321(1996).
124
12 U.S.C. s 222 (1996).
125
Functions and Purposes, supra note 7, at 20 (commenting that checks that are not cleared by the system
are cleared by local clearing houses associations, correspondents banks and directly).
126 .W at 22.
127
Bach, supra note 8, at 3 1
.
128
Id. This situation has changed today and will be discussed in the next chapter of this work.
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and regulations regarding capital adequacy, mergers, branches, investment limitations,
loan limitations and bank holding companies.
129
Banks members have a special prohibition of giving higher interests on deposits to
directors, officers or employees of the system
130
.
6.- Conferences and other Committees
The system organizes several conferences to deal with different policy and operative
problems . The Conference of the Chairman's of Reserve Banks meets in Washington at
least once a year. The Conference of the Presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks and the
Conference of Vice-presidents meets usually four times a year to discuss different
132
topics .
They are also other committees, like the Advisory Committee on Truth in Lending
which meets at the Board's request.
133
B. Bank of the Republic
As mention before, a new structure of the Colombian Central Bank was created in
the Constitution of 1991
I34
. The system is composed of the Bank of the Republic, the
129
Functions and Purposes, supra note 7, at 20.
,30
12U.S.C. s 376 (1996).
131






In the beginning of the 90's several Latin American countries reformed their central banks in a structural
way. Examples of these reforms are Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Salvador, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Peru and Venezuela. In other Latin American countries the process is still going. Most of these
reforms tend to modernize and give certain independence to the Central banks in order to avoid the misused
of monetary policy for government purposes-See Daniel Duenas, Strengthening Central Bank
Independence in Latin America, Recent experiences in Argentina, Chile and Venezuela, Sixth seminar on
Central Banking, 1993.
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Board of Directors of the bank and the General manager of the bank 135 . In this section I
will explain in detail each of these entities.
1.- Bank of the Republic
The Constitution of 1991 broke the Montesquiuev's classic notion of the three
public branches. It created special and independent organs of the state with the
responsibility of fulfilling certain duties. The central bank is one example 136 .
The bank is a public legal person with constitutional rank and with a special and
unique legal regime
137
. The Constitution granted Congress the power to passed a law that
the bank has to respect while exercising its functions
138
and that establishes the patterns
that the government has to follow while issuing the statutes of the bank.
139 Under this
provision, Congress passed law 3 1 of 1992.
According to the constitution, the bank has patrimonial, administrative and technical
autonomy
140
. This is an express recognition of the bank's independence.
Patrimonial autonomy means that it has his own assets in national and international
currency which are managed in its own budget 141 . The bank's assets and profits are used
'"Colombia and Chile adopted this model which is based on the Deutsche Bundesbank of Germany. See
Carlos Ossa Escobar and Jorge Enrique Ibanez Najaar, El Concepto de Autonomia de la Banca Central, LA
AUTONOMIA DEL BANCO DE LA REPUBLICA (Tercer Mundo Ed.,1995)[hereinafter Ossa & Ibanez]
136 Gerardo Hernandez Correa, El Banco de la Republica como Banco Central Independiente (El caso
Colombiano), Conferencia "Los Bancos Centrales de America Latina dentro de su Nueva Estructura
Juridica", Bogota, 1996.
137 Law 31 of 1992 art.l.
,38COLOM.CONT. art 372.
U9
Id. One can see that the government has certain deal of power over the bank since it was granted the
power to issued its statutes.
140 COLOM. CONST, art. 371.
141
Gaceta Constitucional Numero 53 de Abril 18, 1991.
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to cover its expenses, to carry out the functions established in the Constitution and in the
laws, and to create a monetary exchange fund for times of crisis 142 .
By administrative autonomy, the bank is an independent and autonomous organ of
the state created to be the central bank of Colombia and it is no part of the executive,
legislative or judicial branches
143
.
The technical autonomy means that the bank can analyze in a free way, without
interference of other authorities, all the monetary, credit and exchange problems in the




It will be contrary to democratic principles that the bank lacks any kind of control.
Taking this into account, the Constitution establishes political and legal control over the
bank. Every act issued as monetary, exchange or credit authority is subject to legality
control by the Administrative Jurisdiction. Congress exercises political control, since the
Board has to present a complete report to it.
145
The Constitution empowers the President
to inspect, supervise and control the bank.
146
President delegated this authority to the
Banking Superintendency and the Auditor of the bank
147
.
The bank has its domicile and headquarters in Santafe de Bogota. D.C. and has






Corte Constitucional, Sentencia C-050 de Febero 10 de 1994.
144
Id
M5COLOM. CONT. art 371 inc.3.
l46COLOM. CONT. art 372 inc.3.
l47
This supervision, inspection and control power can limit the independence of the bank. Even though,
these types of control are necessary in order to avoid abuses and malpractice.
l48
Decree 2520 of 1993 art. 4.
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2.- Board of Directors of the Bank of the Republic
The Board of Directors of the Bank of the Republic is the monetary, exchange and
credit authority of the country. It is in charge of the direction and execution of all the
functions concerning the bank
149




The Board is composed by seven members which represent the public interests of the
nation
151
. Five of its members are appointed by the President for periods of four years that
can be extended
152
. Two members must be replaced each four years 153 , this way, each
President gets to replace at least two members 154 . The Board's term eliminates pressure
by the government and guarantees that directors cannot be retired by the Government
when they have different points of view. It also promotes long term decisions that
maintain stability and coherence of policies adopted. Anyway, it would have been better
if the Constitution gave a longer terms to the Board's members.
The other two members of the Board are the Minister of Finance, who presides over
the Board, and the General Manager of the bank.
155 The participation of the Minister of
Finance is the mechanism in which the government is represented and even though it
lessens independence of the Board, it is useful because it promotes coordination in the
adoption of economic policies.
149 COLOM. CONST, art. 372.
150
Corte Constitucional, Sentencia C-478 de Agosto de 1994
151 COLOM. CONST, art. 372.
152
See Law 3 1 of 1992 art.34 (establish that the period of each member can be extended only for three
consecutive periods).
153 COLOM. CONST, art. 372.




These members must be exclusively dedicated to the Board. 156 To be a member of the
Board the law requires one to be a Colombian, a citizen exercising political rights, with a
professional degree and with experience of more than ten years in subjects related to
economy, finance, international commerce, banking, and economic law.
157
The Constitutional Court has made it clear that the Board is independent from the
government 158 . Even though this was the intention of the drafters and this principle has
been recognized by the higher Court, the independence of the Board is arguable since the
President is involved in the appointing process, the Minister of Finance is a member and
presides over the Board and it has to act in coordination with macroeconomic policies. In
practice, the Board has been totally independent of political and governmental influence.
As mentioned before, the Board also has the duty to present extensive information to
the Congress relating to all the operation and policies made throughout the year. In this
way, Congress exercises control over the bank.
3.- General Manager of the Bank of the Republic
The Board of Directors elects the General Manager for a four-year term which may
extended for two additional periods
159
.
The General Manager must be exclusively dedicated to the bank. This officer is a
member of the Board of Directors and is the legal representative of the bank and has to
fulfill all the duties established in the law and in the bank statutes
160
.
156 COLOM. CONST, art. 372.
157 Law 31 of 1992 art. 29.
l58
Corte Constitucional, Sentencia C-478 de Agosto de 1994.




MAIN FUNCTIONS AND PURPOSES OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
AND THE BANK OF THE REPUBLIC
Central Banks have a particular role in the regulation of the economy. Even though
Central Banks around the world have differences in their structure, they have some
functions and purposes that are the same. These this functions and purposes have slight
changes in the way they are applied, but in a broad sense they are the same. One also must
consider that in some countries, Central Banks lack some of these functions and that they
also might have additional functions. The main purpose of the Federal Reserve System is
to maintain "long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with
the economy's long run potential to increase production, so as to promote effectively the
goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates,,I6 \
In a very similar way the main purpose of the Bank of the Republic is to maintain the
power of acquisition of the coin and the adoption of specific inflation goals that must be
reduced each year
162
. All the functions and purposes executed by the Bank of the
Republic must be made in coordination with general economic policies.
In this segment the main functions and purposes of Central Banks and the way they
are implemented and treated in American and Colombian systems will be discussed.
I6I
12U.S.C.A. s225a(1997).




A. Monetary Policy Makers
Monetary policy is part of the general economic policies a country adopts
164
and
refers basically to the measures adopted concerning money and credit conditions in a
State. One of the main purpose of this policy is to create price stability in the economy.
Scholars have defined monetary policy as the "action designed to influence the supply
and use of money".
165
This narrow definition must include all means of payable
instruments in order to be appropriate. A broader definition of monetary' policy includes
all the actions designed to control "the used of lendable funds, in the form of loans or
investments, extended by commercial banks and other lending institutions".
166
Central Banks are generally the monetary policy makers of the country . Several
complementary mechanisms can be undertaken by the Central Bank to execute monetary
policies. The most effective and used instruments are open market operations, regulation
of discount operations and reserve requirements
167
. Another important instrument used by
monetary policy makers is regulation of interest rates.
1 .-Open Market Operations.
Open market operations are in broad terms the purchase or selling by Central Banks
of securities, commercial papers and others negotiable instruments . When the Central
Bank purchases this kind of negotiable instruments, the supply of money and bank
reserves are increased. When it sells, they decreased. Therefore, the purchase by the
165
4
The other important economic policy that countries used is fiscal policy.
Haggot, supra note 13, at 484.
i66
Id. This definition includes currency, loans, and investments of saving banks, insurance companies,
pension funds and investment trusts.
167
Purposes and Functions, supra note 7, at 49.
l68MACROECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT: POLICY INSTRUMENTS AND ISSUES, JEFFREY M.
DAVIS, (International Monetary Fund, 15 (1992).[hereinafter Davis]
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Central Banks of these kinds of assets has an expanding effect, while selling has a
contraction effect. The forms and regulations of open market operation vary from one
country to another and their importance is directly related to development of the capital
market.
169
The advantage of open market operations over other type of instruments is that the
Central Bank has the initiative and they do not depend on commercial bank's
responses . Since the Central Bank is not engaged in a particular business activity, it
can alter the selling price at its own discretion 171 . So if it wants to lower reserves, it
reduces the price of the securities and a buyer will appear. These operations are executed
in different ways among the countries due to the dissimilarities between economic size
and development.
In the United States, open market operations are the most popular and used
instruments of monetary policy due to its flexibility and the development of the capital
market. The Federal Reserve mainly buys and sells government securities
173
. Government
securities are the most active in the U.S. financial market
174
. Of the $2,000 billion worth
of marketable government securities more than $220 billion are held by the Federal
Reserve.
175
The government power to tax assures that the creditors will be paid and that's
169
Haggot, 5MjPranotel3, at 491.
170
The opposite to discount operations. See Davis, supra note 165, at 15. (also commenting that OMO are
flexible in time and amount, and that they can be undertaken in the primary or secondary markets).
m
Ritter & Silber, supra note 69, at 215.
172






Ritter & Silber, supra note 69, at 212. (Commenting that these securities where issued when the Treasury
Department had to borrow to finance the budget deficit).
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the reason why these securities are considered risk free 176 . The Federal Reserve also deals
with other instruments like Federal Agencies securities and bankers acceptances
177
.
As mentioned before, open market operations in the United States are regulated and
directed by the Federal Open Market Committee and executed by the New York Reserve
Bank. This process is very complex since it has a direct effect over all the economy.
In Colombia, the Board of Directors can execute open market operations by
purchasing or selling its own titles, public debt titles and any other titles further




Bank reserves consist of a percentage of deposits that cannot be used and must be
held in cash in the bank's vaults and in the central bank. All depository institutions are
subject to reserve requirements that depend on the kind of deposit. If the Central Bank
l76
Purposes and Functions, supra note7, at 52.
X11
Id at 5 1 . See also at 53, (Commenting that this type of instrument competes in the markets with large
CD's, commercial paper and securities issues by States).
m
See Purposes and Functions, supra note 7, at 53-8. (Commenting that the committee meets ones a month,
and that the manager of the System Open Market Account is responsible for day to day open market
operations. Also stating that the decisions of the FOMC are taken by consensus and that information related
to inflation, deflation, balance of payments, employment is examined by the Board).See also Ritter &
Silber, supra note 69, at 216-17 (mentioning all the operative proceedings of an Open Market Operation).
See Bach, supra note 8, at 66-67 (commenting that the FOMC has delegated much of its policy making
powers in this areas to the Executive Committee, just establishing general guides and limits than the latter
has to respect. Also stating that operations are execute by the Reserve Bank ofNew York because its the
biggest bank, with the biggest and more important members and because New York is the place where most
international transactions take place.)
m
See Law 3 1 of 1 992, art. 1 6, lit.b. See also Decree 2520 of 1 993 art. 1 6, lit.b. (stating that from 1 999,
open market operations must be exclusively made through public debt titles).
180One of the reasons for this provision is that the Colombian capital market is still developing and it will be
very difficult to perform this transaction just in the stock market. The authorized Intermediaries are
financial institutions like Banks, Financial Corporations, Savings and Housing Corporations, Pension
Funds, and the National Treasury. See Resolution 4 of 1994 of the Board of Directors of the Bank of the
Republic, art. 1, and Resolution 1 lof 1995 of the Board of Directors of the Bank of the Republic, art. 5 and
9.
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lowers the reserve requirement of a particular deposit, automatically the bank's reserves
are increased and they could lend more money and undertake additional transactions 181 .
This has an expansionist effect that produces more money circulating in the economy. On
the other hand, when reserve requirements are lowered by the Central Bank, bank's will
have less money to lend and there will be less money circulating in the economy. This is a
contractionist policy.
Although reserve requirements are not as flexible as open market operations, they
have a rapid impact in the liquidity of the financial system and costs in the economy.
182
This instrument is used to moderate inflation tendencies and to avoid recession's
tendencies.
The Reserve System Board of Governors is empowered by law to establish the
minimum reserves that member banks must hold against demand and time deposits. The
definition of deposits has been changed during the years in order to include new financial
instruments and to adapt to evolution of the market During the 80's, the Banking Act
and the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act established that all depository
institution, including commercial banks, thrift institutions, credit unions and others, were
subject to reserve requirements determined by the Board, even if they are not members of
the system.
185
Since this act was passed, financial institutions cannot avoid reserve
requirements anymore. Membership in the system is less important if one considers that
m
Ritter & Silber, supra note 69, at 206.
182






Ritter & Silber, supra note 69, at 204.
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reserve requirements apply equally to members and non members, and the difference
between banks and thrift continues to disappear.
186
In a similar way, the Board of Director of the Bank of the Republic is entitled to
establish and regulate the reserve requirements that credit institutions must maintain in
the different kinds of deposits
187
. These requirements are changed periodically due to
diverse monetary and financial issues.
3.-Discount
Discount operations are the mechanism used by Central Banks to lend money to
banks. They are also an important instrument for monetary policy and are used to provide
temporary funds to banks in periods when liquidity is needed 188 . Discount operations are
a clear manifestation of Central Banks as lenders of last resort. Many systems used this
mechanism for crises or to promote different sectors of the economy.
189
Discount operations involve the sale of an eligible paper to the Central Bank or and
advance a loan sign in a promissory note secured by an adequate guarantee.
190
The rates
of discounts are the interests that the Central Bank charges to commercial banks for the
credit. The rate of the discount and its relationship with the market's interest is very
important. If the discount rate is above the market interests, borrowing from the Central
l86
/c/at206.
l87Law 31 of 1992 art. 16, lit.a. The Colombian Financial Statute established four kinds of credit institutions:
Banks, Financial Corporations, Savings and Housing Corporations and Companies of Commercial Finance.
See Decree 663 of 1993, art.2.
l88
Functions and Purposes, supra note 7, at 70.
l89When a Central Bank gives credit to commercial banks with the condition to lend it to determine sectors
at a special interest rate is one example of discount operations used to promote sector of the economy.
l90
Functions and Purposes, supra note 7, at 70.
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Bank is discouraged . Hence, if the discount rate is below the market interests,
borrowing will be stimulated.
From the point of view of monetary effects, if the discount rate is lower, banks will
borrow more from the Central Bank and this situation will produce an expansion of
money and credit. " The opposite situation will take place if the discount rate is higher.
In the Federal Reserve System, the discount rate is a privilege of member banks and is




In Colombia, the Board of Directors is empowered to give authorized transitory
liquidity to credit institutions by discount operations.
194
Right now, the Bank has two
lines of credit, ordinary and special, designed basically to provide liquidity in
extraordinary situations, for example, the drop of deposits in a credit institution.
195
The
Board, periodically determines the rates that the bank will charge in this operations and





Ritter & Silber, supra note 69, at 2 1 1
.
l92
Functions and Purposes, supra note-, at 72. See also Ritter & Silber, supra note 69, at 2 1 1 (asserting that
the discount rate might influence in a direct way the interest market by the "announcement effect")5ee also
Davis, supra note 165, at 16 (According to the author, discount operations must be constrained to elude
alterations ifOMO and the discount rate should be high enough to discourage borrowing from the central
bank).
193
Functions and Purpose, supra note 7, at 71 . The Board is empowered to determine the rate that each
Federal Reserve Bank should charge in this operations and must supervise that they put them into effect.
See 12U.S.C.A. s248(a) (1997) See also 32 Op. Art. Gen. 81(1919). The borrowing by member banks
through discount operations has limits. See 12 U.S.C.A. s345 (1997). For regulation of discount operations
See 12 U.S.C.A. s343-47 (1997)
194
As in the American system, the Board can also provided liquidity byREPO's. See Law 31 of 1992 art.12,
lit.c.
l95
Resolution 16 of 1994, Board of Director of the Bank of the Republic, art.6-13.
l96
Resolution 16 of 1994, Board of Director of the Bank of the Republic, art.3,5.
34
B. Ceiling Interest Rates on Deposits
This measure is used by Central Banks to control price stability and the circulation of
money in the economy. In the American system, the Board of Governors sets maximum
limits on interest rates that member banks can pay on time and saving deposits, among
consultations with other agencies.
197
In Colombia, the Board of Directors can determine the maximum interest rates that
credit establishments can pay for deposits or charge for loans. This measure can only be
taken in exceptional situations and for periods that do not exceed 120 days.
198
C. International Reserve transactions, Management of International
Reserves, and Exchange Policy
Central Banks have some degree of responsibility in determining exchange rates and
managing reserves.
195
Exchange rates are "the price of a unit of domestic currency in
terms of foreign currency"
200
.The exchange rate is a very important issue in the economy
of a country since it affects the price of the goods traded domestically and
internationally.
01
Recently, economic and legal scholars have adopted the thesis that the same entity
must adopt monetary policy and exchange policy. Indeed, monetary policy affects
necessary exchange policy and there is a strong link between them. This has led to the
197
The consultation of the Board is with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board since they have similar power over the institutions subject to there jurisdiction.See
Functions and Purpose, supra note 7, at 85.
l98Law31 of 1992 art. 16, lit.e.
'"Stanley Ficher, Modern Central Banking, Bank of England, 55 (1994).
200
Davis, supra note 165 ,at 37.
20]
Idal 35. It affects the whole price structure.
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conclusion that a Central Bank cannot be totally independent if they do not have full
responsibility in exchange policies.
202
The international reserves of the United States are composed basically by gold,
foreign currency and reserve position in the International Monetary Fund -SDR's-.
Reserves are owned by the Department of Treasury, held by the exchange stabilization
fund of the Treasury and operated by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York which has




The Federal Reserve engages in foreign currency operations to "cushion effect on
international reserve flows of payments due to temporary forces, to smooth out abrupt
changes in foreign exchange rates, and to avoid disorderly conditions in foreign
exchange".
204
The Board of Governors supervises this type of transactions.
205
Exchange
policy in the U.S. is very complex because central banks around the world use the dollar
in their transactions and have them as international reserves.
In Colombia, the Constitution gave the authority to the Board of Directors of the
Central Bank to regulate the exchange rates in coordination with the Minister of
202Tomas J.T. Balino & Carlo Cotarreli, Frameworks For Monetary Stability, IMF,33 1(1994). For this
same conclusion see also Carlo Cotarelli, The Role ofLatin American Central Banks in Foreign Exchange
Policy, Conferences on Latin American Central Banks, Feb. 15- 16, Bogota, Colombia (1996). (Concluding
that specially under unrestricted movement of capitals, if exchange policy is not manage by the same
decision maker, there will be conflict of interests). See also Davis, supra note 165, at 55.
203
Functions & Purposes, supra note 7, at 95- 100.(Doing these operations, they must take into account
Balance of Payments, movements in exchange rates and international financial developments. Operations
with foreign central banks are called Swaps. This transactions are "inter -central banks reciprocal currency
agreements" which involve two transactions simultaneously: a purchase or sale of one currency and an
agreement to resell or repurchase that currency after a period of time).
204




Finance . Supported on this power, the Board issued Resolution 21 of 1993 which is
the exchange statute of the country.
The Bank of the Republic acts in the exchange market, purchasing or selling foreign
currencies according to the Board's recommendations. The bank is also the manager of
the international reserves (Gold. SDR's. foreign currencies, title that represent foreign
currencies) and has to fulfill this function taking into account the public interest and the
benefit for the national economy.
208
D. Clearing House and Role in the Payment System
The Federal Reserve provides several services to depository institutions related to
the system like a network for collecting checks and other papers, a system for electronic
transfer of funds and clearinghouse
209
. These services must be provided to member and
nonmember banks. 10 The Board is the entity empowered to rule the operations of the
payment system
211
. Even though the authority of the Board in these matters was broad, in
1987 Congress passed an Act giving additional powers to the Board in these matters" .
206
See COLOM. CONT. art. 371. See also Law 31 of 1992 art. 16 lit. i. See also Law 9 of 1991.
207Law31 of 1992 art. 16 lit. i.
208Law31 of 1992 art. 14.
209
Robert G. Ballen, Corine Cooper, William B. Davenport, Curtis W. Nyquist, Commercial Paper, Bank
Deposits and Collections, and other Payment Systems,43 Bus. Law. 1305, 1306 (1988).[hereinafter Ballen
& Cooper]
2l0
lndependent Bankers Association of America v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, 500 F2d 812
(1974). (The Court noted that the Board does not have to treat members and non members in a identical
way, but it cannot act arbitrarily).
2u
See 12 U.S.C.A. s 342,360, 248(o), 464, 248(a) (1982).
2,2
Ballen &. Cooper, supra note 207, at 1309. (citing Title VI of the Competitive Equality Banking Act of
1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86 609(c), 101 Stat. 635, 648 (Aug. 10, 1987)).
37
In Colombia, the Central Bank also provides the service of clearing house and other
services related to the payment system
213
. As in the United States, clearing houses can be




The Board of Governors issues Federal Reserve Notes to make advances to Reserve
Banks" . These notes are an obligation of the Unites States and are legal tender for
private and public debts and are the authorized currency of the union"
16
. According to
this, they must be received by Reserve Banks and financial institutions, for taxes, public
debts, and by the public in general .
The Constitution granted the power of issuing currency in Colombia to the Bank of
the Republic in an exclusive way . The monetary unit in the country is the peso.
F. Other Functions of Central Banks
Central Banks have several kinds of functions that vary from one system to another.
Other important functions that Central Banks in most countries perform, includes serving
as fiscal agents of the government and lenders of last resort.
As the fiscal agent of the government, the Reserve System, among other services,
receives deposits from the Treasury
219
, has the custody of U.S. Treasury securities, holds
2l3Law31 of 1992, art.23.
:u
In Colombia , Credit Institutions can participated in the creation of this particular type of enterprises.




Id. See Provenza v. Comptroller of the Currency, 64 Md. App. 563 (1985).
217
12 U.S.C.A. s354 (1997) Another important aspect to address is that Reserve Banks are empowered to
deal with gold, bullion, contract loans of gold and bullion and exchange dollars for gold.See 12 U.S.C.A.
s354(1997).
2,8Law31 of 1992 art. 6,7.
2,9
12 U.S.C.A. s391(1997). These deposits are money and revenues from the Government.
38
Treasury checking accounts, collects payment from buyers of securities, and pays
interests for securities." It also operates as the banker for federal agencies.
In Colombia, the Bank also acts as fiscal agent of the government221 . Under this
function the Bank may lend money to the State in special conditions222 , receive deposits,




In respect to the function of lender of last resort, Central Banks have traditionally
performed this task through mechanisms like the discount window. Economist have
discussed for a long time if this function is necessary, especially when the financial
system is passing through problems of solvency and liquidity. For monetarists, open
market operations are enough to give liquidity to the system and discount operations are
not necessary
4
. The Free Banking School also suggests that this function is not
necessary and that the banking system must be left alone"' . For the Modern Pragmatic
School, these operations are not indispensable unless there is a threat that the problems of
one bank will affect other banks causing contagious bank failures . Regardless of these
doctrines, the Federal Reserve and the Bank of the Republic act as lender of last resort
through discount and advance operations in specific circumstances.
""Functions and Purposes, supra note 7, at 23. (The New York Reserve bank acts as fiscal agent of foreign
countries and central banks). See also 12 U.S.C.A. s391 (1997).
22l Law31 of 1992, art. 13.
222
0nly if there is a favorable vote of all the members of the Board. See COLOM.CONT. art 373.
223Law31 of 1992, art. 13.
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Dirk Shoenmaker, The Lender ofLast Resort and Contagious Risk in Banking, London School of






CENTRAL BANKS AS REGULATORS AND SUPERVISORS OF THE
FINANCIAL SYSTEM
A. The banking system
Due to several factors like their great levels of debt demand, their role in the creation
and regulation of money supply, their susceptibility for crisis phenomenon's, and their
importance in the payment system and in the community, banks have been considered as
997
"special"' . This "specialness" means that all over the world, banking institutions are
treated in a particular and special way different from general corporations. This
specialness is applicable to a certain degree to other depository institutions and to other
types of financial institutions.
Banks and depository institutions are subject to limits in investments, reserve
requirements, restriction on credit, capital requirements, permits to operate and other
additional restrictions. There has been a strong effort by the Basle Committee on Banking
Supervision to harmonize these standards around the world.
As mentioned earlier, the U.S. has a particular and unique dual banking system. This
998
structure consists of federal and state financial institutions . In other words, banks and
thrift institutions can be chartered either by the federal government or by the state
government. This determines the nature of the regulation and the regulatory agencies with
• • 229
jurisdiction over these entities .
227






Another element which makes the American financial system unique and complex
are geographic limitations. These limitations were basically established in the Mc Fadden
Act passed in 1927 and in the Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act of
1956
230
. The Mc Fadden Act stated that National Banks and State Bank members of the
Federal Reserve System can open branches in their home state if competing state banks
were authorized to branch by state law.
231
The Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding
Company Act provided that Bank Holding Companies located in one state were allowed
to acquire banks in other states only if it was expressly authorized by the law of the
state . These provisions gave the power to determine branch banking and expansion to
state legislators. These geographic limitations have affected in a direct way the
competitiveness of the banking industry
233
.
The U.S. financial system is composed of several institutions like National Banks,
State Member Banks, State Nonmember Banks, non insured State Banks, Federal and
State Insured Saving Associations, non insured State Savings Associations, Federal and
State Credit Unions, Bank Holding Companies, Saving Association Holding Companies,
Edge Corporations, Branches of foreign banks and U.S. branches of foreign banks. One
has to bear in mind that other types of financial institutions exist, like trust institutions,
and that business like insurance and securities has a very strong link with the financial
sector.
230
Arthur E.Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big To Fail To Big To Serve? The Potential Risks ofNationwide Banks, 77
Iowa L. Rev. 957, 962 (1992).[hereinafter Wilmarth]
231
12 U.S.Cs 36(c), 321 (1997).
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12U.S.C. s 1842(d) (1997).
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Wilmarth, supra note 230, at 962.
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Federal Reserve Bank ofNew York, Depository Institutions and their Regulators, April 1992.
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This particular structure of the American financial system has historical reasons and
is a product of Congressional reactions to different economic circumstances. Today, more
than 12,000 commercial banks exist in the U.S.
235
and thousands of other kinds of
financial institutions.
Recent technological advances, specially in the computers and communications
fields, have lead to nationalization and globalization of the system
236
. All of these factors
have reflected in a movement toward consolidation of the financial system
237
which apart
from the traditionally decentralized banking structure . This process is taking place in
states that have limited restrictions" mainly through subsidiaries of bank holding
companies, new branches of financial institutions and interstate credit card services. 4
Defenders of banking expansion argued that this process will benefit consumers,
generate economies of scale, produce less risk of bank failure, promote competitiveness
and improve the quality of services. Detractors of banking expansion suggest that it will




Since the process of expansion and consolidation was started in the United States, the
American system is getting more similarities with other systems like the Japanese and the
235





Macey and Miller, supra note 1 2 1 , at 387.
238
Wilmarth, supra note 230, at 959. see also at 961 (stating that decentralized banking is based on the
theory that concentrated financial power will lead to monopoly practices).
239
Id at 963 (commenting that since 1980 every State permits limited branching in its borders, than more
than 40 States allowed statewide branching and that most States have passed laws allowing interstate
acquisition of banks by Bank Holding companies).
240




European . But even though the process of consolidation is taking place, there are still
several limitations at state and federal level.
The traditional role, activities and definition of a Bank have changed in present
times. Savings institutions, financial companies, and other types of financial institutions
are offering products that were before forbidden to them.
243
In the same way, banks are
offering services and products that were not permitted for them in the past, for example,
brokerage services and credit cards.
244
Several laws have been passed that also change in a substantial way the structure of
the financial system. The Monetary Control Act and the Garn-St Germain Act of 1982,
statutes passed by the Congress during the 90's, authorized thrift institutions to offer
NOW accounts which are very similar to checking accounts245 . They also permitted these
institutions to provide money market accounts, overdraft loans, non residential estate
lending and other forms of commercial lending. In 1987 another act related to thrift
institutions was passed. This was the Competitive Equality Banking Act which permitted
Thrift Holding Companies to engage in almost the same activities as Bank Holding
Companies.
247




According to the doctrine, the U.S. model is known as the American Bank Holding Company. The
German and European Community have the universal banking model in which any entity that engages in a
banking activity is considered a bank. In the Japanese model, there is a separation of investment and
commercial banking, and restrictions over common ownership of banks and insurance companiesSee
Macey and Miller, supra note 121, at 744.
243
The Line Of Commerce For Commercial Bank Mergers: A Product Oriented Redefinition, 96
Harv.L.Rev.907, 915 (1893)[hereinafter Harvard].
24Vat914.
245
Daniel J. Mahoney, 'When Bank Mergers Meet Antitrust Law, There 's No Competition ". Why Antitrust
Law Will Do Little To Prevent Over Consolidation Within the Banking Industry, Annual Review of
Banking Law, Vol. 14,Bost. Univert., 313 (Butterworth Publishers ed. 1995). [hereinafter Mahoney].
246
Macey and Miller, supra note 121, at 468.
241
Id at 468. ( citing 12 U.S.C. sl730a(c)(2). (also stating that this act permits multiple Savings and Loan
43
A very important act passed recently, is the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery
and Enforcement Act of 1989. This act amends parts of the Bank Holding Companies
Act, permitting Bank Holding Companies to acquire savings and loan associations.
249
In
this way, holding companies are able to operate banking and savings institutions
230
Another issue to consider in the American banking system is that mergers and
acquisitions are one of the most important forms of expansion in the banking system.
These mechanisms have gained a lot of popularity in the past years and are constantly
being used by Bank Holding Companies and banking entities in the process toward
consolidation of the system.
251
In 1994, Congress passed the Riegle Neal Interstate Banking and Branching
Efficiency Act. This act modifies the Douglas Amendment Act in the sense that it
authorizes Bank Holding Companies to acquire banks regardless of state law252 . It also
authorizes mergers of banking institutions from June 1997 without consideration of state
law
233
. Now states can only restrict mergers and acquisitions of Banks and Bank
Holding Companies in limited circumstances
254
.
Colombia has a less complicated financial system especially if one takes into account
that there is not any type of branching restrictions and that there is not a dual banking
Holding Companies to engage in the same activities authorized to Bank Holding Companies).
248
Mahoney, supra note 245 .at 13.
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Todd R. Kornfeld, Developing in Banking Law: 1994, Annual Review of Banking Law Vol. 14,Bost.
Univert. Butterworth Publishers ed. 1995) 151.
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structure. Before 1990 the Colombian financial system had the specialized banking
model. The system was composed of several financial institutions with specific and
limited functions and purposes. Each financial institution was authorized to provide
certain kinds of financial services or products. During the past seventy years, different
kinds of institutions were created. When a new financial instrument was created in the
national and international markets or every time there was a need to develop a specific
sector of the economy, a new type of financial institution was founded. Institutions like
commercial banks, mortgage banks, financial corporations, leasing and factoring
companies, and many more existed. Each of these had there own objectives, goals and
target markets.
This legal and economical structure became obsolete. The financial system was not
efficient and competitive, and had very high operative and administrative costs. Besides,
big financial groups began to appear, raising additional problems like lack of control and
supervision as a group, attempted by these groups to control other sectors of the economy
and increase in the oligopolic structure of the system. This situation with other factors
produced a financial crisis in 1992.
Due to these reasons and that Colombia decided to become an open market economy,
the necessity for a deep financial reform was perceived. Many discussions of the banking
model that should be adopted emerged. Some held that the specialized banking model
should be maintained.
55
Others were in favor of the adoption of the Universal banking
model in which one institution is authorized to offer all kinds of financial products and
services.
255
The model of specialized banking is criticized because it is inefficient, raises prices of credit, produces
high costs, promotes small companies that are unable to undertake big financial projects and makes more
difficult the adoption of monetary policy. It's advantages are that it makes the system more competitive and
the influence of financial institutions over the economy is less.
256
The Universal Banking model or Multibank is characterized because it reduces operative and
administrative costs of financial institutions, decreases the cost of credit and provides for a more efficient
45
In 1990, after revising the government project, Congress decided to adopt an
intermediate banking model known as Filial' s and Subsidiaries, similar to the American
Bank Holding Company model. The advantage of this model was that it eliminated the
dangers of the other models but it took advantage of its benefits. In fact, this model
produces economies of scale but avoids conflicts of interests and reduces risks of
contagious bank failure among parent and subsidiaries' companies.
According to law 45 of 1990, Banks, Financial Corporations and Commercial
Finance Companies can participate in the capital of trust companies, stock commisionists,
leasing companies, pension funds management companies and general deposit stores.
Saving and Housing companies were permitted to invest in trust companies and pension
funds management companies. 5 In other words, credit establishments were allowed to
participate in the capital of financial services companies.
Under this structure, each entity has his own capital, administration and accounting,
and filial's and subsidiaries are not allowed to participate in the capital of the parent
company.
This law also gave total liberty for foreign investors to invest in financial institutions
without any limitation.
In 1993 the government, empowered by law 35, issued a decree adopting the statute
of the financial system which unified all existing financial legislation. " According to the
statute, the Colombian financial system is composed of credit institutions, financial
system. This model also makes supervision and adoption of monetary policy easier and allows the system to
satisfy credit requirements for big projects. The negative side of this model is that is promotes oligopolies
and individual entities acquire great influence over the economy as a whole.See LA BANCA MULTIPLE,
MIGUEL ACOSTA ROMERO,( Editorial Porrua, Mexico, 1991).
257
See Law 45 of 1990.
258Law45of 1990, art. 28.
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See Decree 663 of 1993.
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service companies and capitalization societies.
260
Banks, financial corporations, housing
and savings companies and commercial finance companies are considered credit
establishments. On the other hand, trust companies, general deposit stores and pension
funds management companies are considered as financial service companies.262
This statute settles all the operations and activities that each entity can undertake.
The innovation introduced by the statute was that different types of financial entities were
empowered to participate in several operations and services that were restricted in the
past. In this way, the model adopted in the financial reform was faded, moving discreetly
toward a universal banking structure with the only difference being that several types of
institutions, and not just one, can provide almost the same financial services and
products.
Today, the Colombian system is developing in an important way. The institutions
owned by the government are being privatize, many foreign investors are acquiring
existing banks or are creating new financial institutions. Technology, globalization and
competitiveness have improved and costs will decrease eventually. The main problem
still remaining is the high rates of market concentration and the oligopolic structure of the
system.
B. Regulation and Supervision
The most common regulator of economic issues in democratic countries is the
Congress. Generally, this power is granted by the Constitution. Congress establishes the
general parameters that must be adopted and determines the agencies with the power to
intervene for a more detail regulation for the day to day operations. The financial system








changed every time there is a variation or innovation in the system. All of the above
reasons justify the existence of specific regulators in order to have a more effective and
efficient system. Indeed, these regulators have to respect the general parameters
established in the Constitution and in the laws that empowered them. Baring this in mind
and for the purposes of the financial system, regulation can be defined as the formulation,
by authorized agencies, of specific rules for the conduct of banking.
263
These rules must
promote healthy practices for the correct practice of the business of banking.
The safety and soundness of depository institutions and other financial companies is
very important for the economy and monetary stability for reasons already mentioned in
this work. In order for banking regulations to fulfill their purpose and to avoid future
problems, the responsibility of supervising the achievement of these rules must be granted
to someone. In this context, one can define Supervision as an activity with the basic
purpose of determining if banks, other depository institutions, and financial institutions
are operating in accordance with the law and regulations. Supervision is essential to
provide the system with security, transparency, confidence and to avoid abuses, crisis and
panics. It will not make any practical sense if regulations existed and there was not a
supervisor to enforce them. Besides, supervision is needed for confidence and security of
investors and the general public.
The American regulatory and supervisory system over the financial system is very
complex. It is composed of several agencies empowered by Congress in various laws,
with different jurisdiction and sometimes with overlapping authority. The most
representative federal agencies in these fields are the Federal Reserve, the Comptroller of
the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Office of Thrift
Supervision.
263
Functions and Purposes, supra note 7, at 108.
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The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency is part of the Department of Treasury
and is empowered to charter national banks and has the duty to regulate and supervise
them.
264
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is an independent agency directed by a
board composed of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Director of the Office of Thrift
Supervision and three members appointed by the President for a six-year term. This
agency provides deposit insurance to national banks, state banks, and some thrift
institutions. It also supervises institutions with deposit insurance, handles bank failures
-\ s c
and manages the insurance funds. " Insured institutions have to pay a premium to the
FDIC over their deposits. Since 1980, the insurance coverage over deposits increased to
$100,000 dollars. This entity is very important considering that federally chartered
institutions and states members are required to have federal insurance while state
nonmember institutions have this possibility.
The Office of Thrift Supervision was created by the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989. Among other functions, this agency is in charge
of regulating and supervising insured and state chartered Saving and Loan Institutions and
Savings and Loan Holding Companies.
264
Today the OCC supervise over 3.075 national banks. SeeCanrwell F. Muckenfuss, III, Bank Regulation
and Financial Modernization in the United States, at 1 (Conference on Latin American Central Banks: Their
new legal Structure, Prepared by Gibson, Dunn,& Crutcher, Washington, Feb. 13, 1996)[herinafter
Muckenfuss].
265Macey and Miller, supra note 121, at 61 .See 12 U.S.C 1 8 1 7(b)( 1 )(a) (the system is risk based in which
each Financial institution is classified according to several factors. Principal regulator of non-members state
banks).
266
Muckenfuss, supra note 264, at 3.The definition of deposit is very important and has been subject of
several litigation Today, the FDIC regulates and controls over 975 institutions The insurance system is
criticized because it produces a bad incentive for banks and increases the cost for the public. See Macey
and Miller, supra note 121, at 253. The effectiveness of the FDIC is also a question because of bank failures
occurred during 1989 and 1991.
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Macey and Miller, supra note 1 2 1 , at 6 1
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They are some fifty-one State regulators and supervisors, and other institutions with
regulatory and supervisory powers operating in different jurisdictions, like the National
Credit Union Administration and the Resolution Trust Corporation. 268
In Colombia, the 1991 Constitution provided a dual form of regulation. The
intervention of the financial sector is performed by Congress through a general law that
determines the limits, reaches and purposes that have to be followed by the
government . This provision finished a discussion that took place for a long period of
time between scholars and the courts in relationship with the power of each state branch.
The president can intervene in the system but always in accordance with the law passed
by Congress. Another form of regulating the system is the one exercised by the Central
Bank that will be discussed further in this work.
Under the constitutional attribution. Congress issue Law 35 of 1993 which
established the general parameters, objectives, purposes and criteria that must be
observed by the government while regulating the financial system. This law empowered
the Ministry of Finance to regulate, through the Technical Vice Ministry, several issues of
the system, for example the types of operations that each entity can undertake, regulation
concerning capital adequacy and terms of operations.' Powers granted to the
Government have their limits because they cannot alter the structure of the system. In
practice, the broadness and generality of Law 35, means that the system is regulated by
the President through the Technical Vice Ministry of Finance.
268Wat62.
269COLOM. CONST, art. 150, num. 1 1, art. 150, num. 21, art. 150, num. 19, art. 120.
270Law35of 1993, art. 34.
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Supervision is a constitutional responsibility of the President which exercises this
power in accordance with the law. Supervision is done over the activities and over the
persons involved in financial activities.
271
The President delegated this faculty to the Banking Superintendency, which is a
technical organism, enclosed in the Ministry of Finance. This Superintendency was
created in the earlier 20's and has been organized through numerous government decrees.
Its main purpose is to control, inspect and supervise all financial institutions, insurance
companies and the Bank of the Republic.
272
The deposit insurance is provided by the Fund of Guarantees of Financial Institutions
-FOGAFIN- which deals with institutions having solvency problems" . This entity does
not have the powers and prerogatives that the FDIC has in the U.S.
C. Federal Reserve System
The Federal Reserve System is one on the main regulators and supervisors of the
American banking system. For the purposes of this work, we will focus on its power over
banks, bank mergers, bank holding companies, international banking and other ways of
intervening in the system.
1 .- Supervisory Powers over banks
The Federal Reserve has the responsibility to supervise state member banks. Among
other things, it approves their admission to the system, supervises their activities and
enforces regulations
274
. It also regulates technical matters of their operation. Some of this
authority is delegated to the Federal Reserve Banks.
27lLaw35of 1993, art. 10.
272
Decree 1284 of 1994, art.2
273&?eLaw 117 of 1985.
274
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These regulatory and supervisory functions are shared with state governments
agencies, a situation that sometimes produces overlapping responsibilities. As mention
already, national banks are regulated and supervised by the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency, which informs the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve about of
operation of this kind of banks.
275
2. - Mergers
One way of expansion of the banking system that is being used frequently by banks
and bank Holding Companies are mergers .
276
These transactions sometimes raise
concerns because they have the ability to produce anticompetitive effects. Mergers and
acquisitions can be either horizontal or market extension. The concept of horizontal refers
to mergers or acquisitions of institutions who were in direct competition within a given
777
market before the transaction took place. Market extension transactions are those
mergers or acquisitions between banks who were in a different market and did not
978
compete in a direct way prior to the transaction. .
The Bank Merger Act deals with merger transactions and other forms of combination
of depository institutions like acquisitions.
27
The act expressly establishes that an
insured depository institution should obtain prior written approval of the responsible
agency if it has the intention to merge with another insured
280




See Wilmarth, supra note 230, at 961.(commenting that this process has taken place specially during the
80's and 90's).
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institution . This approval is also necessary if an insured depository institution is trying
to acquire assets or assume liabilities of other insured
282
or non insured depository
283
institutions.
If the resulting, acquired or assuming institution is a state member bank, the
responsible agency will be the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
284
The
Comptroller of the Currency has authority to approve these kinds of transactions if the
surviving institution is a national bank and the FDIC if it is a State nonmember bank.285
This is a clear manifestation of the Reserve System as Regulator and Supervisor.
To obtain Boards approval, there is a special procedure that the merging companies
have to follow. Before the Board approves the transaction, the proposal must be
published with intervals in a form authorized by the agency and in a newspaper of
general circulation in the headquarters where the institutions are located.
287
Management, financial and future projections of the resulting institution are
considered by the Board to grant approval" . The Board of Governors, as the responsible
agency, has the duty to request reports in competitive factors involving the transaction to
the Department of Justice and should not approve if it finds that the transaction will
result in a monopoly of the business of banking, resulting in a combination or conspiracy
281
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to monopolize, an attempt to monopolize or its effects are to lessen competition or
restraint of trade. The principles of these provisions are taken basically from the
Sherman Act and the Clayton Act.
290
The parameters for analyzing anticompetitive effects in merger transactions of
banking institutions are the same as general antitrust laws.
291
The first thing to do when
analyzing a case in which a merger is involved, is to define the relevant market. In order
to do so, first a definition of the relevant line of commerce or product market is
required. ' Afterwards, the Board has to define the geographic market
293
. The next step
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The definition of product markets in mergers of banks is based on what the court has called the "cluster
approach". This concept refers to the cluster of services and products denoted by the term "commercial
banking". This principle was adopted by the Court in U.S. v. Philadelphia National Bank 374 U.S. 321
(1963) and emphasized in United States v. Phillipsburg National Bank & Trust Co. 399 U.S. 350 (1970).
In U.S. v Connecticut National Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974) the inclusion of saving institutions in the product
market was expressly rejected by the Court, but the possibility that in future cases, when the developing of
the financial system is in such stage that there is no need to distinguished from commercial banks, was let
open. Recently, in United States v. Central State Bank. 817 F2d 22 (1987) the Court reaffirmed the "cluster
approach". This approach has been criticized because the financial system is very different now. Consumers
have today the option of choosing between banking and non banking institution to satisfy their credit
requirements. Changes and developments have made possible for thrift institutions to provide almost the
same products and services as banks. See The Line Of Commerce for Commercial Bank Mergers: A
Product Oriented Redefinition, 96 Hard. L. Rev. 907,915 (1983). This new thesis has not been accepted yet
by the courts.
293
See Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S .321, 356(1963). The definition of the geographic market will
determine if the merger or acquisition will be horizontal or market extension. InPhiladelphia National
Bank the court stated that in determining the geographic market one must look not at where the merging
parties do business or where do they compete but to the "area of competitive overlap" where the effect of
the merger on competition will be direct and immediate. This narrow approach was maintained in
Connecticut National Bank 399 U.S. 350 (1970). For some legal scholars, changes in the banking system
have made this approach obsolete. Any change in these definitions will have a strong repercussion in future
bank merger cases.
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Id at 309. Traditionally, the determination of the market share was measure by the shares held by the
biggest firms in the market. This method has been replaced by 'Herfindahl-Hirshman Index" contains in
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Despite this conventional analysis, the statute authorized the Board to allow the
transaction in the name of the public interest if it finds that it will serve the convenience
and needs of the community
295
. This exception called by the doctrine the "public interest
defense" makes possible mergers or acquisitions that in other contexts will violate
directly the antitrust laws and will not be permitted.
The Bank Merger Act introduces a new mechanism to challenge merger transactions
for antitrust reasons. In fact, the Act expressly states the term in which the transaction can
be challenged for antitrust purposes. This action should be commenced after the approval
of the transaction and before its consummation.
297
Once the merger is consummated and any antitrust litigation commenced before the
consummation is terminated, it can never be attacked again for violating antitrust laws.
In other words, the merger will be immune from antitrust challenge by the Department of
Justice and private parties.
299
the Department of Justice guidelines concerning horizontal mergers and acquisitions. The main objective of
the guidelines is to generate predictability of the enforcement of antitrust laws by the Federal Trade
Commission and the Department of Justice. The guidelines established the parameters that the agencies will
apply to horizontal mergers in order to determine if they substantially lessen competition. Even though the
guidelines are not always consistent with case law, they do not necessarily reflect the state of the law, and
are not binding to the Courts, they are a good parameter for antitrust scrutiny..See U.S. Department of
Justice and Federal Trade Commission 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 (1992)
See also ELEANOR M. FOX & LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, CASES AND MATERIAL ON
ANTITRUST, 750 (West Publishing Co., 1989) See also Joshua F. Greenberg &Atan Arbisser, The
Antitrust Aspects ofMergers, 634 PLI/Corp 71, {citing FTC v. PPG Industries, Inc., 780 F2d 1550,1503-4







12 U.S.C. s 1828 (c)(7)(a)(1997). The lapse of time required to consummate the merger or acquisition
depends on the comments made by the Attorney General related to competitive factors but it can never be
less than fifteen days calendar after approval.
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Macey and Miller, supra note 121, at 445. See also Gorinson, supra note 30, at 424, (stating that the
Antitrust Division has 30 days after approval to challenge under antitrust laws. Also that now there is more
cooperation between this division and the Office of the Comptroller and there is a possibility to "fix-it-firsf
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Of course this provision does not mean that in the future the resulting financial
institution is exempt from the fulfillment of antitrust laws.
300
Additionally to agency
scrutiny, during the terms established by the Act, this type of transaction can be
challenged by the Department of Justice if it concludes that there is a violation of the
Sherman Act or the Clayton Act.
301
The Riegle Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act passed in 1994,
provided that in case of mergers of State member banks there is an express prohibition for
banks which hold at least 10% of the deposits of insured institutions in the U.S. to merge
with another depository institution. The Board must also consider this point. This
restriction is also extensive to banking institution and its affiliates if they control 30% or
more of the insured deposits. Each state is empowered to modify this percentage.302
3.-Bank Holding Companies
The Regulation of Bank Holding Companies is based on the perception that they
must be constrained due to their size and influence in the economy,
303
and to avoid
before approving the merger in order to abolish any future problem).
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12 U.S.C. s 1828 (c)(7)(c)(1997). However several differences exist between special banking laws and
general antitrust laws. For example, depository institutions need to get prior approval of the transaction by
the responsible agencies while non depository institutions do not required prior approval. Transactions that
under general antitrust laws are anticompetitive can be allowed in the financial system if they benefit the
public interest in general antitrust laws, there is not an explicit exception like this. Banking regulations also
defers from general antitrust laws because they impose a "30-day stay" of the transaction after it is approved
by the responsible agency. Passed these term without being challenged, the merger or acquisition is immune
from antitrust challenged. See Macey and Miller, supra note 121, at 444.
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Mahoney, supra note 245, at 313. Even though special laws exist, general antitrust law is still
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Clayton Act to bank mergers. See United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374, U.S. 321 (1963). See
also United States v. First National Bank of Lexixton, 376 U.S. 665 (1964). The Court has emphasized that
legislative history of the Bank Merger Act and the Bank Holding Company Act reflects that Congress did
not intend to displace the enforceability of the Sherman Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act, and therefore
they are still applicable.
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monopolies and restraint of trade.
304
Another purpose of this Act was to emphasize the
separation between banking and commercial activities. The Bank Holding Company Act
was passed in 1956 by Congress and it was amended in 1970.
3(b
Legislative history of
the Bank Holding Company Act reflects the desire of legislators to prevent the
concentration of the financial system and to implement a policy against control of singles
entities of banking and non banking organizations.
306
Another important issue for the
enactment of the BHCA. was that it will serve as source of strength to the subsidiaries.307
A Bank Holding Company is a company that controls a bank or another company
which controls a bank. The definition of "bank" and the term "control" are very
important in order to determine if an entity can be considered a bank holding company.
' Prior to the Competitive Equality Act of 1987 "banks" were defined in a very simple
and narrow way. After this Act, and for purposes of the Bank Holding Company Act,
banks were defined as insured institutions that accept demand deposits and are engaged in
the business of making commercial loans
310
. Non insured institutions by the FDIC can
also be considered banks if they offer "check like" deposit accounts
311
. A bank holding
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Purposes and Functions, supra note 7, at 1 10 .
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Denial By The Board OfGovernors Of The Federal Reserve System On Application For Bank Merger,
Consolidation, Or, Acquisition On Anticompetitive Grounds Under 3(c) ofBank Holding Company Act Of
1956, 71 A.L.R. Fed. 4438 (1985)[hereinafter A.L.R.].
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'Macey and Miller, supra note 121, at 302.
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Macey, supra note 1 1 , at 30 1
.
57
company controls a bank when it has 25% or more of the voting shares, has a strong
influence in its management or controls the election of the directors.312
A company that becomes a Bank Holding Company has to register with the Board of
Governors which is empowered to regulate all the issues related to it
313
. The Board also
has the faculty to examine that its regulations have been adopted by the Bank Holding
Companies or the subsidiaries . These are clear examples of the Central Bank as
regulator and supervisor of the system.
This Act granted authority to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve to
approve transactions of Bank Holding Companies in banking institutions and in
companies with business closely related to banking.
315
In relation with banking transactions, any acquisition of more than 5% of the voting
shares of a bank, or of all the assets of a bank, and any acquisition that produces that the
company will become a Bank Holding Company or a subsidiary of a bank Holding
Company, requires prior approval by the Board of Governors.
316
In order to approve or deny these kinds of acquisitions, the Board considers several
issues. One of the main factors the Board considers when reviewing a Bank Holding
Company activity is the competitive factor. The statute expressly establishes that the
Board should not authorize any acquisition, merger or consolidation of a Holding
3I2
12 U.S. C. s 1 84 1 (a)(3)( 1 997). The Board has great discretion in determining when control exists. There
is a presumption that a company that owns or control less than 5%, does not have control for the purposes
of the BHCA. See Macey and Miller, supra note 121, at 371.
313
12 U.S.C. si 844(b) (1997). See also 12 U.S.C. si 844(f) (1997).
314
12 U.S.C. sl844(c) (1997). When the Company violates a regulation of the Board, this entity can
establish money penalties and imprisonment. See 12 U.S.C. sl847 (1997). Parties can obtain review of an
order issued by the Board in the U.S. Court of Appeals. See 12 U.S.C. si 848 (1997).
3,5
12 U.S.C. sl842 and sl843 (1997).
316
12 U.S.C. si 842(a) (1997). After the application is received, the Board notifies the Comptroller of the
Currency or the supervisory agency for comments. Afterward, the Board issues an order denyingor
approving the application See also 1842 si 842 (b).
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Company that will result in a monopoly, a combination or conspiracy to monopolize, an
attempted to monopolize or that substantially lessens competition, or restraints trade of
the business of banking in the United States.
317
These antitrust principles are borrowed
from the Sherman Act and Section 7 of the Clayton Act
318
.
The Board uses the traditional antitrust analysis, defining the product market, the
geographic market and the market share in order to determine if the transaction will have
an adverse effect on competition.
319
Like in the Bank Merger Act, the merger or
acquisition can be approved even if it has anticompetitive effects, if the Board finds that
the transaction will benefit the public interest because it meets the "convenience and
needs of the community to be served".
323
Before it grants or denies approval of the
acquisition, the Board must also take into account financial and managerial resource
factors, and community benefits .
321
This statute also forbids Bank Holding Companies from engaging in business not
related to banking, but this provision is flexible if one considers that Congress
established several exceptions to this provision.
317
12 U.S.C. s 1842 (c)(l)(A)(B)(1997).
3,8
A.L.R., supra note 306, at 438.
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The Board of Governors position defining the product market has been to use the "cluster approach"
when it has to approve acquisitions by Bank Holding Companies. The Board also uses the HHI to measure
the concentration of the market. See Irving Bank Corporation v. Board ofGovernors ofthe Federal
Reserve System, 845 F2d. 1035,1039 (1988). (Case that involved a horizontal acquisition and merger of two
bank holding companies. These acquisitions were approved unanimously by the New York State Banking
Board and by Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve which found that it will not have a perverse effect
on competition. The Board used the "cluster approach" to determine the product market establishing that it
was the "commercial banking business". In determining the geographic market, the Board also used
traditional standards. The Court decision emphasized the principle that "findings of the Board as to the
facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive".
320
12 U.S.C. sl242 (c)(l)(B)(1997).
321
1 2 U.S.C. s 1 842(c)(2)(4). The Board looks at convenience for the community to be served ,and financial
and managerial elements like experience and integrity of directors and officers.
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12 U.S.C. s 1843(c)(1997).
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One of the main exceptions refers to the possibility of Bank Holding Companies to
engage in activities that the Board has determined "closely related to banking or
managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto"
323
. The Board has
tremendous power to decide if a business activity is related or not to banking. Under this
provision, the Board issued Regulation Y which established activities that are considered
closely related to banking. According to this, Regulation activities like trust services,
financial advisory, leasing of real property, underwriting of credit life insurance and
securities brokerage services are considered related to banking and hence are permitted
for Bank Holding Companies. This exception has been subject to multiple decisions by
the courts and has extended the reach of these entities to different kinds of business.
Before a Bank Holding Company acquires or engages in a nonbanking activity, it
should seek for a decision of the Board considering the activity closely related to
banking. If a Bank Holding Company desires to acquire 5% or more of the shares of a
company that is under these exceptions, it needs prior approval of the Board. In its
analysis the Board also considers competitive and public benefit factors
With the objective of controlling the power of these institutions, the Riegle Neal
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 introduced a rule that consists in
forbidding Bank Holding Companies with 1 0% or more of the total deposits of insured
institutions to acquire other institutions ~ . In this way the size and influence of these












have more than 30% of the total deposits of insured institutions in a particular State328 .
Each State is empowered to modify this percentage
329
. In making its decision, the Board
must bear in mind these new provisions.
4.- International Banking
International banking can have two main different forms; International activities of
American banks and foreign banks engage in business in the U.S.
The International activities of U.S. banks are regulated mainly by the Board of
Governors. These activities can adopt different forms, like branches, agencies or
representative offices abroad, Edge Corporations, Export Trade Companies, subsidiaries,
foreign investment and International Banking Facilities.
Member banks of the Federal Reserve System are allowed to open branches in a
foreign country
330
. This mechanism needs approval by the host country and by the Board
ill
of Governors but only for the first two countries where it has established a branch.
Edge Corporations are federally chartered institutions engaged in international
business and regulated by the Federal Reserve. They do not have restrictions on
interstate banking and are free from most reserve requirements. There are two kinds, of




330Macey and Miller, supra note 121, at 708. Also commenting that the FDIC regulates these activities for
non member banks.
33




333Macey and Miller, supra note 121, at 70.
61
foreign firms, and banking edges which perform the traditional banking services like
deposit taking.
334
Exporting Trading Companies were created in 1982 to promote credit to medium and
small exporters.
335
They are subject to regulations by the Reserve Board. Bank Holding
Companies and Edge Corporations can invest up to 5% of their capital and surplus in
these companies. These transactions can be disapproved by the Board to prevent
concentration, an adverse effect on the Bank Holding Company and for lack of
information provided.
In accordance with the International Banking Act of 1978, the Board authorized U.S.
banks to have international banking facilities. The purpose of this measure was to bring
back to the United States off shore business. International banking facilities are
regulated by the Board of Governors but application and approval is not necessary.
339
The advantage of these entities is that they avoid reserve requirements and state taxes, but
they keep the same privileges of any banking organization in the U.S.
Another mechanism for participating in international markets is by investing. Foreign
investment by banks and Bank Holding Companies is subject to the Board's Regulation
K. These operations must be reported to the Board. A bank can also operate through
334
Id. American banks are authorized to invest up to 10% of their capital and surplus.
l35
Kourides, supra note 331, at 352.
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340Macey and Miller, supra note 121, at 710. (Commenting that they do not have FDCI deposit insurance
and are designed to accept deposits from foreigners).
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subsidiaries, which are required to comply with the norms, regulations and supervision of
the host country .
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency also regulates and supervises some of
these activities. It is important to consider that the Glass-Steagall Act which prohibits
banks to engage in securities business, does not applies to operations in foreign
countries.
41
Regarding operations of foreign banks in the U.S, the Board gives authorization
before they initiate any type of operation in the country . In this process, the Board looks
if in its country of origin, the bank is subject to "comprehensive and consolidated"
supervision, the managerial and financial resources, the experience in international
operations, the cooperation of the foreign bank regulators and the bank's capacity to
adequate controls in order to comply with U.S. law
342
. The Foreign Bank Supervision
Enhancement Act of 1991 empowered the Board to terminate authorizations of foreign
banks if they are not observing the regulations. Additionally, foreign banks are obliged
to comply with reserve requirements and they are also provided with deposit insurance
343
.
5.- Other forms of regulating the system
As mentioned before, most of the traditional tasks performed by the Federal Reserve
have a direct or indirect impact on the financial system. In some cases, this function can
be considered regulation or intervention over the system.
One of the purposes of the Federal Reserve System is to promote moderate long-term
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given to the Board of Governors by Congress to determine interest rates mentioned in
Chapter VI, is a clear example of regulation over the system.
Monetary policies also have a direct and strong impact on the financial sector.
Reserve requirements established by the Federal Reserve, influence the capacity to lend
money. The discount window determines the cost of some funds for financial institutions
and their availability in some special circumstances.
These traditional central bank functions that are directly focused to adopt and execute
monetary policy regulated some of the system's activities and operations. Regarding
Open Market Operations, they have an impact on the system but they cannot be
considered a regulation of the system.
Even though the clearing house function is more of a service the Federal Reserve
gives to depository institutions, it has a direct effect on the system since it affects the
payment system. The Board's management of these issues is also regulation of the
system.
D. Bank of the Republic
The Bank of the Republic lacks specific powers to regulate and supervise the
Colombian financial system. As already noted, regulation over the system is made by
Congress and the Ministry of Finance, while supervision is performed by the Banking
Superintendency, which is enclosed in the Ministry of Finance. Despite this
consideration, the central bank executes certain duties that involve regulation of the
system. Moreover, as any central bank in the world, the Bank of the Republic functions
have a direct or indirect impact on the whole system.
As in the Federal Reserve System, adoption and execution of monetary policy and
control of inflation rates influence the whole financial system
4
. The power of the Board
345COLOM.CONST .art. 372. See also Law 3 1 of 1992, art. 2.
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of Directors of the Bank of the Republic to determine the discount rates and the lines of
credit available for financial entities can be consider regulation over the system. In the
same way, establishment of reserve requirements over deposits is another example of
regulation.
Measures determining ceilings on interest rates in exceptional circumstances and for
specifics periods of time are another forms of regulating the system. Open market
operation cannot be deemed as regulation of the system, but the effect produced over the
system is clear.
Regulations adopted by the Board of Director under its powers as the supreme
exchange authority, in some event's affect the Banks international operations, activities of
financial institutions with presence in Colombia and operations of the Banks with foreign
investment.
The use of measures regarding clearing house services is another form of regulating
the system. Supervision concerning the adoption of these measures by financial
institutions is performed by other agencies.
Even though the Bank has some powers to regulate the system, the majority of the
regulations are made by the technical Vice Ministry of the Ministry of Finance. The
question if the Bank of the Republic should be given regulatory and supervisory function
will be address later in this work.
E. Arguments in favor of Regulation and Supervision of the financial system
by Central Banks
The question if regulation and supervision of the financial system should be done by
central banks has been discussed by scholars. Various arguments against and in favor
exist.
65
The main arguments that support regulation and supervision by central banks are
related basically to monetary stability, overlapping of authority and the need for
coordination between these functions.
Modern central banks are concentrating more in monetary and price stability. A
fragile financial system or a financial crisis will have a negative impact on monetary
stability
346
. Moreover, long run price stability produces financial stability
347
. So the
conclusion is obvious, central banks must be directly involved in the creation of a healthy
and strong financial system and therefore they need to be more involved in their
regulation and supervision .
In many industrialized countries one authority regulates banking, securities and
insurance . Fewer supervisory institutions exist because of the tendency to universal
banking. For some part of the doctrine, central banks should also participate in regulating
and supervising the capital market since it also affects monetary and financial stability.
This thesis can also be supported if one keeps in mind that recently developments reflect
a shift in consumers' demand from traditional financial institutions to securities and
insurance firms. This extreme model has been adopted in countries like Norway and
Denmark were there is one regulator and supervisor for everything.350
Ruth de Krivov, Central Banks and the Financial System in Latin America, at 3, (Conference on Central
Banks in Latin America, Bogota, Col.,Feb.,1996) (Stating that it also brings social, political, economical
problems, lose of confidence in banks)[hereinafter Krivoy]
347
Alex Cukierman, The Economics of Central Banking, at 33(for the eleventh World Congress of the
International Economic Association, Tunis, Tunisia, Dec, 1995)[hereinafterCukierman].
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Krivoy, supra note 346, at 3.
^Restructuring of Financial Regulation Responsibilities, Federal Reserve Bulletin July 1994 550-53.
(Commenting that in Germany, France and Japan, supervisory functions are shared with banking
commission or the minister of Finance while in United Kingdom, Italy and the Netherlands the Central Bank
is the supervisor. In Belgium and Switzerland the central bank is less involve in these) See also Macey and
Miller, supra note 121, at 747 (stating that Canada and Japan have separate supervisors for banking and
securities activities).
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Krivoy, supra note 346, at 1 1
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Another argument in favor is coordination. As already mentioned, monetary stability
requires a safe and sound financial system. This can be achieved by giving supervision
and regulation to one entity like the central bank or to delegate this functions to separate
entities that coordinate in a perfect way.
351
Regulation and supervision are effective only if there is a permanent coordination
between banking regulators and monetary policy makers. Coordination is essential to
anticipate banking crisis and to adopt fast and effective measures. If a panic or crisis
occurred, the central bank might have to injected cash or credit in the economy
performing its duties of lender of last resort
352
. These measures can be more useful and
preventive if the Central bank has the powers to regulate and supervise. If the central
bank lacks these power it has to be permanently involved. In times when countries are
experiencing economical or financial difficulties or when there is no coordination
between regulators and supervisors with the central bank, it is better to assign this
functions to the central bank.
333
Another positive aspect of this approach is that it avoids overlapping of jurisdiction
and duplication in regulations and supervision that usually occur when separate
institutions exist.
354
Regulation and supervision have to be effective and inexpensive.
Besides, in a crisis situation decision have to be adopted fast.
Technology has improved, the market is being liberalized and barriers in the financial
market are being eliminated around the world. Besides, financial conglomerates and
351M
352
C.A.E. Goodhart, Should the Central Bank Act as Supervisorfor Banks, Financial Market Group,
London School of Economics, .[hereinafter Goodhart].
353
Krivoy, supra note 346, at 5.
354
Goodhart, supra note 352, at 1
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multinational financial institutions are being created. Regulation involves time and
expenses. This suggests that regulation must be simplified. 355
Having these responsibilities delegated to the central bank reduces the cost of the
government, avoids conflicts between diverse organs of the state, reduces time and
increases the effectiveness of the measures adopted. Also, the information collected by
supervisors is very useful for a proper adaptation of monetary policies.
Giving these powers to the central bank also produces additional benefits like a more
skilled and specialized personnel in these areas that can apply measures with a more
professional standard .
35
' It encourages that decisions will be made more on economical
grounds rather than for political reasons.
357
Finally, it is the perfect complement for
central banking independence.
F. Arguments against Regulation and Supervision of the financial system by
Central Banks
Regulation and supervision by central bank have several critics. The main concern is
that a central bank with these power becomes excessively powerful for a democratic
society, especially if it is independent. For some scholars, this power will facilitate
disguise rescue operations and increase the risk of favoritism.
'
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C.A.E. Goodhart, Some Regulatory Concerns, Financial Market Group ,London School of Economics, at
6/10. (also proposing regulation by two bodies. The first one, is the Investor protection body, directed for
small investors from threat of insolvency. According to the author, it should be in charge of deposit
insurance and focused over small financial institutions. The second body will be the systematic stability
which will be empowered to handle issues like capital adequacy and the safety and soundness of the system.
This regulatory body will be very important because of the need to have an adequate payment system and
because one failure can produce a contagion in other institutions. It will basically concentrate on Banks,
Securities and insurance firms. [hereinafterC.A.E. Goodhart]
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Another concern is that monetary policy and banking supervision can conflict in
some circumstances. For example, when liquidity problems are affecting the economy,
the Central Bank has to focus on its function of lender of last resort instead of price
stability. The political pressure over the bank will increase the risks that rescue
operation will involve financing by the general public.
361
There is a theory among some part of the doctrine according to which, even with
optimal supervision, bank failures should occur. Under this context, a bank failure, even
though it not necessarily negative for the system, will weaken credibility and reputation
of the bank, having disastrous effects in the economy. Besides, any failure within the
system will be the responsibility of the central bank. This is another reason that will
increase the temptation of the central bank to use monetary expansion to solve problems
of insolvent banks.
363
Another negative point is that since banking institutions may participate in financial
services activities and in non-banking activities, the central bank will also have to
regulate and supervise them. To the same extent it will need these same powers over
securities and insurance companies.
Finally, some scholars have found evidence that in countries with a regulator and
supervisor separate from the central bank there is less inflation rates.
,60
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See Goodhart, supra note352, at 3. Another example of conflict of interests will be when monetary policy
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
As commented in the introduction of this study, there are strong structural
differences between the United States and Colombia, like size, economic power, political
and legal structure. These differences also are reflected in institutions like the Central
Banks and in the financial sector.
The Federal Reserve System is a unique and special system, with participation of the
private sector, organized in three levels: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve,
Reserve Banks and Bank Member. Between them, we find the Federal Open Market
Committee, an entity with very important and discretionary functions in the managing of
the monetary policy, and with public and private participation.
Colombia's Central Bank has a more simple structure and only public interests are
represented. The system consists of the Bank itself, the Board of Directors of the Bank
and the General Manager.
The Federal Reserve System was originated in a law passed by the Congress in the
use of its Constitutional powers. The Bank of the Republic had also legal status, but since
1991 was given constitutional status. The Federal Reserve System has been amended on
several occasions but its structure continues to be the same as the one established by the
Federal Reserve Act of 1913. On the other hand, Colombia's system has been modified in
a structural way a great number of times due to deep political changes. From my point of
view, this instability reflects in a negative way on the economy and even though
modifications have to be made in accordance with economical changes, the structure of
a legal entity must be kept for a long period of time in order to be developed in a positive
69
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way. Probably that was one of the reasons to give the Central Bank constitutional status.
The new system adopted in the 1991 Colombian Constitution, will be very difficult to
change and this way it will probably develop in a natural way.
Another difference between the two systems relates to the Board. The period of the
members of the American Board of Governors is superior to the Colombian Board of
Directors. This situation gives more stability for policies adopted.
The American Senate participates in the appointment process by advising and
consenting while in Colombia, neither the Senate nor the House of Representatives is
involved in the process. I think that in order to have less political interference in these
important areas, it is better that the Congress does not play any role in this process.
Other differences with less importance are for example that in the Colombian System
the President of the Board is the Minister of Finance. In the United States, the Chairman
of the Board is appointed by the president and the Secretary of Treasury is not part of the
Board. Having a member of the government on the Board lessens the independence of the
decisions but helps to have a more coordinated economic policy.
We can also find similarities between theses two Central Banks. Both Central Banks
systems play a very important role in the regulation of the economy, were created in the
beginning of the century, and have a relative strong independence from the government
and other powers. The American and the Colombian systems have discretionary powers
to regulate their areas', they have patrimonial autonomy and they make reports to
Congress.
The President participates in a direct way in the appointing process in both systems
and members of the Board need to have special skill qualifications and must be dedicated
completely to the Board. The Federal Reserve System and the Bank of the Republic have
71
adapted to the evolution and changes in the banking system, gaining a more predominant
role in the regulation of the economy.
Central Banks have a particular role in the regulation of the economy. The main
functions of modem central banks are to control monetary policy and price stability.
Monetary policy is the mechanism designed to influence and control the supply and use
r- 366
of money.
In the American system, the principal way of making monetary policy is by the Open
Market Operations. In Colombia, this mechanism is starting to develop in a very
important way. Open Market Operations have the advantage that they can be adopted by
the Central Bank whenever is needed and at its own discretion.367
Regulation of the financial system can be understood as the formulation by
authorized agencies of specific rules for the conduct of banking These rules must promote
healthy practices for the correct practice of the business of banking. Undertaking of Open
Market Operations by the Federal Reserve or by the Bank of the Republic affects the
normal course of the financial system, but it cannot be considered regulation.
Other important instruments for monetary policy making are reserve requirements on
deposits and discount operations. Reserve requirements have a very fast impact in the
liquidity of the financial system and costs in the economy. In the U.S., since the Banking
Act and the Garn-St.Germain Depository Institutions Act were passed, reserve
requirements apply equally to members and non members institutions. This particular
situation makes this mechanism very important. In Colombia, the Board of Directors of
65 Aman, supra note 20, at 843.
366
Haggot, supra note, 13, at 484.
367
Ritter and Silber, supra note 69, at 215.
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the Bank of the Republic is empowered to establish and regulate the reserve requirements
that credit institutions must have in the different kinds of deposits.
Concerning discount operations, they are considered also an important instrument for
making monetary- policy and are a clear manifestation of Central Banks as lenders of last
resort. The Federal Reserve System and the Board of Directors of the Bank of the
Republic are in charge of determining rates and conditions for discount operations.
Both reserve requirements and discount operations affect and influence in a direct and
essential way affecting their capacity to lend and the availability and cost of some funds
in special circumstances. These two operations are clear examples of regulation over the
system.
Other functions performed by the Federal Reserve System and the Bank of the
Republic, like determining ceiling on interest rates, regulating clearing house services and
adopting some exchange policy measures can also be considered regulation of the
financial system.
Supervision is as an action undertaken by authorized agencies with the basic
purpose of determining if banks, other depository institutions, and financial institutions
are operating in accordance with the law and regulations. Supervision is essential to
provide the system with security, transparency, confidence and security. It also helps to
avoid abuses, crisis and panics.
For part of the central banking doctrine, supervision and regulation of the financial
system should be made by the central banks since there is a strong relation with these
functions and monetary stability. Also because duplication and overlapping are avoided
and solutions to problems can be adopted faster. Other advantages of this model are that
government costs are reduced, conflicts between organs of the state are eluded, decisions
368Law31 of 1992, art.16, lit.a.
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are made more on economical grounds and it is the perfect complement for central
banking independence
Supervision and regulation of the financial system by central banks is also criticized
by some scholars. The main reasons for these critics are that the bank becomes too
powerful for a democratic society, monetary policy might conflict with regulation and
supervision, and there is a higher risk that panics and failures will be solved by monetary
expansion. Moreover, the Central Bank will have to regulate all kinds of financial
services and non banking activities and in case of a failure or a financial crisis the bank
will be held responsible, losing its credibility and having a very negative effect in the
economy.
The American regulator}' and supervisory system over the financial system is very
complex. It is composed of several agencies empowered by Congress in various laws,
with different jurisdictions and sometimes with overlapping authority. The most
representative federal agencies in these fields are the Federal Reserve, the Comptroller of
the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Office of Thrift
Supervision and the fifty-one State regulators and supervisors.
The Federal Reserve is one of the regulators and supervisors of the system. Among
other functions, the central bank approves the admission and regulates state member
banks. It has the power to approve bank mergers and acquisitions and regulates and
approves activities and operations of bank holding companies. The Federal Reserve also
approves, regulates and supervises international activities of U.S. banks and activities of
foreign banks in the U.S.
In Colombia, the 1991 Constitution provided a dual form of regulation. The
regulation of the financial sector is performed by Congress and the Ministry of Finance.




The Bank of the Republic lacks any specific or express
functions as regulator or supervisor of the system besides the traditional central banking
activities.
The financial system in the United States and in Colombia is changing very rapidly.
International agreements on financial services are being subscribed by various countries
like in the European Community and the North American Free Trade Agreements.
International standards for banking supervision have been settled by the Basle
Committee. The World Trade Organization has recently subscribed an agreement on
services that might cover financial activities. There is a tendency to internationalization
and globalization of the system and to the adoption of universal banking schemes.
Technology, specially in computers and in communication, has revolutionized the
financial market. The system is being liberalized and barriers are being eliminated around
the world. Financial conglomerates and multinational financial institutions are also being
created.
Since regulation and supervision involves time and expenses it is necessary to
simplify it and to adopt general rules applicable to all kinds of institutions.
370
Regulation
and supervision of financial systems and related markets cannot be insulated from the
Central Banks because they are responsible for the stability of the system.
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Decree 1284 of 1994, art.2
,70
.C.A.E. Goodhart, supra note 355, at 6-1 0/1 5( the author proposed regulation by two bodies. The first
one, is the Investor protection body, directed for small investors from threaten of insolvency. According to
the author, it should be in charge of deposit insurance and focused over small financial institutions. The
second body will be the systematic stability which will be empowered to handle issues like capital adequacy
and the safety and soundness of the system. This regulatory body will be very important because of the need
to have an adequate payment system and because one failure can produce a contagion in other institutions.
It will basically concentrate on Banks, Securities and insurance firms.
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This brings us to the ultimate questions. Should the Federal Reserve System
functions as regulators or supervisors be abolish? Should the Bank of the Republic be
empowered to regulate or supervise the system? Should regulation be simplified?
Recently, the Clinton administration proposed the creation of a single entity that
charters, supervises and regulates all banks, thrifts, holding companies, and foreign bank
activities in the U.S. This entity will be called the Federal Banking Commission. Under
the Government's proposal, the FDIC will keep the administration of deposit funds and
the Federal Reserve System will keep its central bank's function.
The Federal Reserve opposed strongly the government's proposal arguing that
supervision and regulation by a single regulator will destroy the dual banking system, will
disconnect the system from macroeconomic policy affecting growth and stability and will
111
reduce the ability to control and avoid crisis. According to the Federal Reserve,
Central Banks should be involved directly in supervision and regulation of the system.
Otherwise, it will become just an academic institution
374
. Finally, they proposed that
regulatory and supervisory functions should be given to two federal entities to avoid
duplicative supervision. , one of them the Federal Reserve. In this way, the Federal
Reserve will maintain its functions and regulation and supervision will be simplified.
The Government proposal was not passed in Congress but the discussion still
remains. The problem of having several regulators and supervisors, like in the United
!72
Muckenfuss, supra note 264. at 3.
Statements to the Congress, by Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, Before the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, Federal
Reserve Bulletin, 384, March 2, 1994.
Id. According to the Federal Reserve, in all countries of the G-7 except Canada the Central bank is
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States, is that shopping for the more permissive agency is promoted, costs are higher, and
overlapping and duplicative examination exists.
There is no doubt that the American regulatory and supervisory system needs to be
simplified, specifically if one takes into account all the deep changes occurring lately in
the system. There are too many entities with overlapping jurisdictions and duplication is
evident.
This does not means that the functions performed by the Reserve System should be
eliminated. The Federal Reserve must continue to be involved in order to have a sound
"inn
financial system .
But the creation of another regulator is necessary to maintain balance and
equilibrium . In my opinion, the proposal by the Board of having two federal entities in
charge is very attractive. The Central Bank will continue with its regulatory and
supervisory function and monetary stability will not be risk. On the other side, the
creation of another entity, like a banking commission will produce many benefits,
because it will eliminate duplication and overlapping. It will promote efficiency, reduce
costs and time and will create a balance of powers over the system.
In Colombia, the situation is a little different. Even though the financial system is
developing faster every day, political, economical and social problems have sometimes
interrupted this process. A fragile financial system or a financial crisis will have a very
negative impact on monetary stability. Moreover, long term price stability produces
'"Restructuring of Financial Regulation Responsibilities, Federal Reserve Bulletin, 551, July 1994. (also
commenting that is a responsibility of Central Banks to have an efficient payment system. Monetary policy
can be affected by disturbances of Financial markets. Regulatory policies have a great impact for monetary




financial stability. In Latin America, and particularly in Colombia, this situation is
possible since these societies are in transition.
379
The Banking Superintendency, is presently doing a very good job in supervising the
system. Regulation is made essentially by the Technical Vice Ministry of Finance.
Regulation and supervision in the hands of the government gives him too much power
over the system. I think it should be healthy for the system to have regulation by the
central bank. Supervision can continue to be performed by the Banking Superintendency.
This approach will have very positive effects because it will balance the powers and
neither the Board nor the government will have total autonomy over the system. Besides,
this suggestion will reduce costs, avoids potentially duplication and overlapping, promote
monetary stability, fortify independence, improve efficiency, eliminate possibilities of
conflict of interests and encourage decisions based more on economic rather than political
grounds. A Constitutional reform will be needed to make such a modification.
i79
Krivoy, supra note 346, at 3.
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